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Between a Rock and a Hard Place:
Landlords, Latinos, Anti-Illegal
Immigrant Ordinances, and Housing
Discrimination
Rigel C. Oliveri
62 Vand. L. Rev. 55 (2009)
In the face of federal inability to effectively police our
national borders and to remove unauthorized immigrants, many
local governments have recently sought to take measures into their
own hands by passing anti-illegal immigrant ("Al") ordinances.
These ordinances usually contain a combination of provisions
restricting housing, employment, and public benefits for
unauthorized immigrants, among other things.
This Article focuses on All provisions that are targeted at
private rental housing, which typically take the form of sanctions
against landlords who rent to unauthorized immigrants. Faced with
penalties for renting to unauthorized immigrants, landlords have
the clear incentive to screen their tenants' immigration status.
However, given the difficulty of ascertaining legal status (and the
absence of any reliable mechanism for doing so), landlords are
instead likely to resort to short-cuts, such as refusing to rent to
"foreign-seeming" people and discriminating based on accent,
surname, appearance, or other ethnic markers. As a result, these
restrictions are likely to (1) cause landlords to violate the federal
Fair Housing Act, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of
national origin, and (2) lead to discrimination against all ethnic
minority groups whose members look or sound "foreign," regardless
of their immigration or citizenship status. In addition to the
violations of federal fair housing law that are likely to occur, there
are significant public policy arguments against immigration-related
housing restrictions.
Federal intervention is therefore necessary. Congress must
act to prevent municipalities from enacting and enforcing such
restrictions. Moreover, Congress must itself resist pressure to enact
immigration-related housing restrictions as a matter of national
policy. But this is not enough. Historic and current levels of
housing discrimination against national origin minorities and

immigrants indicate that these groups are already in need of greater
protection, yet the law contains significant gaps in coverage. Both
alienage and legal status remain permissible bases for
discrimination under the Fair Housing Act. As long as this is the
case, discrimination against national origin minorities who are
citizens and legally present noncitizens is encouraged to continue.
Thus, the Fair Housing Act should be amended to contain explicit
protection for both alienage and legal status.
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Asking landlords to enforce immigration laws makes
about as much sense as requiringgrocers to demand
a green card before selling a gallon of milk.
-Editorial, CHI. TRIB., OCT. 16, 20061
INTRODUCTION

In recent years, few topics have been as controversial and
polarizing as illegal immigration. Federal efforts at policing the border
between the United States and Mexico are widely regarded as
ineffectual, and efforts to locate and deport unauthorized immigrants
have scarcely made a dent in the population of approximately 12
million estimated to be living in the United States. 2 In the wake of
these failures, attempts at local and private enforcement of
immigration laws have proliferated. 3 Many local governments have

1.

Editorial, Mayberry I.N.S., CHI. TRIB., Oct. 16, 2006, at A18.

2.
JEFFREY S. PASSEL, PEW HISPANIC CENTER, THE SIZE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE
UNAUTHORIZED MIGRANT POPULATION IN THE U.S. 2 (2006), http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/

61.pdf.
3.
See, e.g., Hiroshi Motomura, Federalism,InternationalHuman Rights, and Immigration
Exceptionalism, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1361, 1365 (1999) (noting the increase in state and local
involvement in immigration law); Huyen Pham, The Private Enforcement of Immigration Laws,
96 GEO. L.J. 777, 785-96 (2008) (describing private enforcement of immigration laws in the areas
of employment, housing, and transportation); Cristina M. Rodriguez, The Significance of the
Local in Immigration Regulation, 106 MICH. L. REV. 567, 569 (2008) (noting the rise of state and
local efforts to control immigration); Peter Spiro, Learningto Live With Immigration Federalism,
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recently sought to take measures into their own hands by passing
anti-illegal immigrant ("All") ordinances. These ordinances typically
contain a combination of provisions: they make English the "official
language" of the municipality, eliminate gathering places for day
laborers, penalize employers for hiring unauthorized immigrants,
restrict unauthorized immigrants' access to public benefits, and
4
prevent unauthorized immigrants from renting housing.
Attempts by subnational governments to pass such measures
have received much attention in the scholarly literature, primarily
because of the questions they raise about the appropriate allocation of
immigration enforcement authority between federal, state, and local
governments. 5 Most of the treatment, however, fails to engage in a
substantive analysis of the provisions themselves; to the extent it
does, it tends to lump the individual provisions of the All measures
together. 6 Nonetheless, the various areas implicated by AII
ordinances-housing, employment, public assembly, public benefits,
and municipal administration-operate
within different legal
frameworks and raise different sets of concerns.
This Article focuses on All provisions targeted at private rental
housing, which typically sanction landlords who rent to unauthorized
immigrants and may also require that all prospective tenants have
their immigration status verified prior to entering into a residential
lease. My analysis reveals that it is difficult (if not impossible) for
landlords to verify the immigration status of every potential tenant
they encounter. They are instead likely to resort to shortcuts, such as
discriminating based on accent, surname, appearance, or other ethnic
markers. As a result, I argue that these restrictions: (1) will cause
29 CONN. L. REV. 1627, 1640-42 (1997) (observing the dramatic expansion of the role played by
states and localities in immigration law and policy).
4.
Not every AII ordinance contains all of these types of provisions, but all contain some
combination of the above. There are many other state laws that could fall under the description
of "Anti-Illegal Immigrant" legislation, including those which limit eligibility for in-state tuition
and require proof of legal residency in order to obtain a driver's license. Because this Article
focuses on municipal ordinances, these state laws will not be addressed in any significant detail.
5.
See generally Clare Huntington, The Constitutional Dimension of Immigration
Federalism, 61 VAND. L. REV. 787 (2008); Michael A. Olivas, Immigration-Related State and
Local Ordinances: Preemption, Prejudice, and the Proper Role for Enforcement, 2007 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 27; Pham, supranote 3; Rodriguez, supra note 3; Peter H. Schuck, Taking Immigration
Federalism Seriously, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 57; Spiro, supra note 3.
6.
Two notable exceptions are Pham, supra note 3, at 785-96, and Kristina M. Campbell,
Local Illegal Immigration Relief Act Ordinances: A Legal, Policy, and Litigation Analysis, 84
DENV. U. L. REV. 1041, 1041-45 (2007). Both discuss the various types of provisions. Their
treatment of the housing issues, while good, is brief and only accounts for a fraction of each
paper. Peter Schuck also addresses the substantive policy issues surrounding state action on
immigration-related matters, but he focuses only on employer sanctions, employment-based
admissions, and cooperative law enforcement. Schuck, supranote 5, at 64.
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landlords to violate the federal Fair Housing Act, which prohibits
discrimination on the basis of national origin and (2) will lead to
discrimination against all ethnic minority groups whose members look
or sound "foreign," regardless of immigration or citizenship status.
Although fair housing laws frequently pit landlords against tenants,
in this situation the interests of the two groups are aligned: national
origin minorities do not wish to be discriminated against, and
landlords do not wish to be put in the untenable position of attempting
to comply with All ordinances that put them at risk of violating the
Fair Housing Act.
In addition to the likelihood that All ordinances will result in
violations of federal fair housing law, there are also significant public
policy arguments against immigration-related housing restrictions.
These rights-oriented and practical arguments stem from the
importance of housing, the nature of the landlord-tenant relationship,
the ways in which the results of All housing measures will conflict
with the measures' stated goals, and the unique harms that housing
discrimination creates.
Because of these problems, I conclude that federal intervention
is necessary. To protect national origin minorities and other legally
present noncitizens from housing discrimination, and to keep
landlords in compliance with fair housing law, Congress must act to
prevent municipalities from enacting and enforcing such restrictions.
Further, given the policy problems inherent in immigration-related
housing restrictions, Congress itself must resist pressure to enact
them into federal law.
But this is not enough. Historic and current levels of housing
discrimination-both private and municipal-against national origin
minorities and immigrants indicate that these groups are already in
need of greater protection. Yet the law contains significant gaps in
coverage that can prevent these groups from obtaining equal access to
housing. Both alienage (whether a person is a citizen of the United
States) and legal status (whether a person is legally present in the
United States, and, if so, under what conditions) remain permissible
bases for discrimination under the Fair Housing Act. As long as this is
the case, landlords may attempt to take immigration enforcement into
their own hands by refusing to rent to people who they believe to be
unauthorized immigrants, or whose legal status they deem
insufficient. This will invariably lead to continued discrimination
against "foreign-seeming" national origin minorities (regardless of
their citizenship) and legally present noncitizens. Thus, the Fair
Housing Act should be amended to contain explicit protection for both
alienage and legal status. Put another way, not only should private
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landlords not be forced to consider these factors when renting housing,
they should in fact be prevented from taking them into account.
Part I discusses the AII ordinances generally in terms of their
history, housing contents, and current status. Part II analyzes the
probable effects of the housing provisions and how these outcomes
violate the Fair Housing Act. Part III addresses additional public
policy arguments against AII housing restrictions. Part IV offers
suggestions for how the law can address the situation, both in terms of
counteracting the AII ordinances and in terms of more proactive
reforms to protect national origin minorities who are citizens and
legally present noncitizens from housing discrimination.
I. THE AII ORDINANCES

A. Background
The first of the contemporary crop of municipal AII ordinances
was proposed in April 2006, in San Bernardino, California. 7 The
ordinance's housing provisions were brief:
Illegal aliens are prohibited from leasing or renting property. Any property
owner/renter/tenant/lessee in control of property, who allows an illegal alien to use, rent
or lease their property shall be in violation of this section, irrespective of such person's
intent, knowledge or negligence, said violation hereby being expressly declared a strict
8
liability offense.

Violation of the ordinance was punishable by a fine of not less
than $1,000 per day. The ordinance failed on a four to three council
vote, and supporters subsequently unsuccessfully fought to have it
placed on the ballot for a popular vote. 9 A few months after the San
Bernardino measure failed, Hazleton, Pennsylvania became the first

7.
San Bernardino, Cal., Illegal Immigration Relief Act Ordinance (proposed April 2006),
available
at
http://firecoalition.comdownloads/San Bernardino-Illegal- mmigration Ordinance.doc. During the 1990s, some states passed what might be considered precursors to
these All ordinances. The most well known of these state laws is California's Proposition 187, a
ballot initiative which eliminated most public benefits for unauthorized immigrants and forbade
their attendance at public schools. 1994 Cal. Legis. Serv. Prop. 187 (West) (approved Nov. 8,
1994), overturned in significant part by League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F.
Supp. 755, 786-87 (C.D. Cal. 1995).
8.
Illegal Immigration Relief Act Ordinance, supra note 7.
9.
Ashley Powers, Petition Would Force Vote on Illegal Immigrant Curbs, L.A. TIMES, Apr.
27, 2006, at B4; James Sterngold, San Bernardino Seeking "Relief": Struggling City's Proposal
Targets Illegal Immigrants, S.F. CHRON., Jun. 11, 2006, at A4.
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municipality to actually adopt an All ordinance. 10 Hazleton's
ordinance is much longer and more detailed than the San Bernardino
measure, and its language became the model upon which most
subsequent ordinances were based.
As of this writing, aproximately 105 localities in twenty-nine
states have considered Hazleton-style All ordinances." Of these
localities, forty-two have passed All ordinances containing housing
restrictions. Six of these housing ordinances have been challenged in
court from: Hazleton; Valley Park, Missouri; Farmers Branch, Texas;
Cherokee County, Georgia; Escondido, California; and Riverside, New
Jersey. 12 Enforcement of all All ordinances was essentially put "on
hold" pending the outcome of litigation over Hazleton's ordinance in
the case of Lozano v. City of Hazleton.13 The suit was widely viewed as
a test case for these types of laws. 14 On July 26, 2007, the Middle
District of Pennsylvania struck down Hazleton's ordinance on a
variety of grounds, most of them related to federal preemption and
due process concerns. 15 As a result, most of the housing All ordinances

10. Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 2006-18, Illegal Immigration Relief Act Ordinance (July 13,
2006), available at http://clearinghouse.wustl.edu/detail.php?id=5472
(hereinafter Hazleton
Ordinance).
11. The Fair Immigration Reform Movement maintains a database of AII ordinances,
available at http://www.immigrantsolidarity.org/Documents/Nov06OverviewLocalOrdinances/
OverviewofRecentLocallmmigrationOrdinancesandResolutions.pdf (last visited Jan. 22, 2009).
12. Farmers
Branch, Tex.,
Ordinance 2903 (May 22,
2007), available at
http://www.ci.farmers-branch.tx.us/sites/default/files/Ordinance%/2ONo /222903.pdf [hereinafter
Farmers Branch Ordinance]; Cherokee County, Ga., Ordinance 2006-03 (Dec. 5, 2006), available
at http://clearinghouse.wustl.edu/chDocs/public/IM-GA-0001-0003.pdf
[hereinafter Cherokee
County Ordinance]; Valley Park, Mo., Ordinance 1715 (Sept. 26, 2006), available at
http:/clearinghouse.wustl.edu/chDocs/public/IM-MO-0001-0009.pdf
[hereinafter Valley Park
Ordinance 1715], amended by Valley Park, Mo., Ordinance 1721 (Feb. 14, 2007), available at
http://clearinghouse.wustl.edu/chDocs/public/IM-MO-0001-0015.pdf
[hereinafter Valley Park
Ordinance
1721];
Escondido,
Cal.,
Ordinance
2006-38,
available at
http:/!
clearinghouse.wustl.edu/chDocs/ public/IM-CA-0001-0002.pdf [hereinafter Escondido Ordinance];
Riverside, N.J., Ordinance 2006-16, Illegal Immigration Relief Act Ordinance, amended by
Riverside,
N.J.,
Ordinance
2006-19,
available at
http://clearinghouse.wustl.edu
/chDocs/public/IM-NJ-0001-0005.pdf, and Riverside, N.J., Ordinance 2006-26, available at
http://clearinghouse.wustl.edu/chDocs/public/IM-NJ-0001-0006.pdf
[hereinafter
Riverside
Ordinance 2006-26]. Because these six ordinances are the most well documented and because
they are fairly representative of the ordinances that have been passed around the country, they
will be the primary focus of this Article.
13. 496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 484 (M.D. Pa. 2007).
14. See, e.g., Julia Preston, City's Immigration Restrictions Go On Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
13, 2007, at A13 (describing Hazleton litigation as "a test case about the power of cities to crack
down on illegal immigration").
15. At the time of this writing, Hazleton was appealing the case to the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit. American Civil Liberties Union of Pennsylvania, Challenge to
Hazleton's Anti-Immigrant Ordinance, http://www.aclupa.org/issues/immigrantsrights/hazleton/
index.htm (last visited Jan. 1, 2009).
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16
have either been enjoined by courts or repealed by local legislatures.
For reasons discussed, infra, however, it is likely that we have not
seen the last of local attempts to institute immigration-related
housing restrictions.

B. Housing Provisions
The housing provisions in each Hazleton-style ordinance were
enacted under the municipalities' zoning and code enforcement power.
The housing provisions typically contain two basic components: (1) an
enforcement procedure that relies on outside complaints and landlord
sanctions and (2) a pre-authorization procedure requiring all
prospective tenants to be screened for legal status before they can
enter into a lease agreement.

16. As of this writing, the status of the AII ordinances in the five other municipalities in
which litigation occurred is as follows: Valley Park: Gray v. City of Valley Park, No.
4:07CV00881-ERW, 2007 WL 2303952, at *1 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 8, 2007) (dismissing housing-related
aspects of the case), and Reynolds v. City of Valley Park, No. 4:06CV01487-ERW, 2006 WL
3331082, at *9 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 15, 2006) (involving a housing ordinance that the city amended in
July 2007, removing all reference to immigration, and case was dismissed as moot in August
2007); Cherokee County: Robert Stewart, Inc. v. Cherokee County, No. 1:07-cv-00015-TCB (N.D.
Ga. filed Jan. 4, 2007) (entering consent order for permanent injunction against ordinance),
Escondido:
available at http://clearinghouse.wustl.educhDocs/public/IM-GA-0001-9000.pdf;
Garrett v. City of Escondido, 465 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1060 (S.D. Cal. 2006) (entering a temporary
restraining order in November 2006, which lead city to voluntarily withdraw ordinance on
December 14, 2006); Riverside: Riverside Coal. of Bus. Pers. & Landlords v. Township of
Riverside, No. l:06-cv-05521-RMB-JS (D.N.J. filed May 11, 2007) (involving an ordinance that
the city repealed in September 2007, after which plaintiffs agreed to dismiss the case), available
and Assembly of God
at http://clearinghouse.wustl.educhDocs/publicIM-NJ-0001-9000.pdf,
Church Riverside v. Township of Riverside, No. 1:06-cv-03842-RMB-AMD (D.N.J. filed Nov. 2,
2007) (following the repealed ordinance in September 2007, plaintiffs filed a summary judgment
motion and request for attorneys' fees), available at http://clearinghouse.wustl.edu/
chDocs/public/IM-NJ-0002-9000.pdf; Farmers Branch: Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of
Farmers Branch, Nos. 3:06-CV-2371-L, 3:06-CV-2376-L, 3:07.CV-0061-L, 2007 WL 1836844, at
*5 (N.D. Tex. June 26, 2007) (denying city's motion to dismiss without prejudice), and Villas at
Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, Nos. 3:06-CV-2371-L, 3:07-CV-0061-L, 2008 WL
2201980, at *19 (N.D. Tex. May 28, 2008) (granting plaintiffs motion for partial summary
judgment and entering permanent injunction). While the case was pending, Farmers Branch
enacted a new version of its AII ordinance, Ordinance 2952 (Jan. 22, 2008), available at
http://www.ci.farmers-branch.tx.us/sites/default/fies/Ordinance%2No%202952.pdf, which cures
many of the deficiencies noted in the court's June 2007 order. The new ordinance was challenged
by the ACLU and the Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund, and a preliminary
injunction was granted. See Press Release, ACLU, Farmers Branch, Texas Anti-Immigrant
Ordinance Is Blocked While Challenge Continues (Sept. 22, 2008), available at
The Farmers Branch City
http://www.aclu.org/immigrants/discrimI36876prs20080922.html.
Council, which plans to appeal, has declared that the ordinance is not to take effect pending the
outcome of the litigation.
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1. Complaint-Driven Enforcement Procedures
Most of the municipalities rely on a complaint mechanism to
enforce their ordinances. The complaint mechanism allows anyone to
file a complaint with the municipality stating that he suspects a
resident of a dwelling unit is an unauthorized immigrant. Hazleton's
ordinance, for example, provides that:
An enforcement action shall be initiated by means of a written signed complaint to the
Hazleton Code Enforcement Office submitted by any official, business entity or resident
of the City. A valid complaint shall include an allegation which describes the alleged
violator(s) as well as the action
constituting the violation, and the date and location
17
where such actions occurred.

Once the enforcement office receives a complaint, the city
notifies the landlord, who then has a matter of days to provide the city
with identifying information about the particular resident.' 8 The city
forwards this information to the federal government to verify the
resident's immigration status.19 If the city learns that the resident is
not legally authorized to be in the United States, it will inform the
landlord, who then has a relatively short period-typically a few
days-to cure the violation by convincing the resident to leave the unit
voluntarily or by instituting an eviction action. 20 If a landlord must
undertake formal eviction procedures, the landlord will bear the court
and administrative costs himself, which typically run around $200 per
eviction.
If the landlord fails to remove or take steps to remove the
resident within the allotted time, his rental license for the unit will be
suspended and he will be prevented from collecting rent. 21 Significant

17. Hazleton Ordinance, supra note 10, § 5(B)(1). This language is similar to the language
commonly used in municipal ordinances for the reporting of suspected violations of the property
maintenance code. Other ordinances with similar complaint procedures include those enacted by
Cherokee County, Escondido, Riverside, and Valley Park.
18. Id. § 5(A)(3) (landlord must provide information within three days); see also Cherokee
County Ordinance, supra note 12, § 18-504(c) (within five days); Valley Park Ordinance 1715,
supra note 12, § 5(A)(3) (within three days); Riverside Ordinance 2006-26, supra note 12, § 1665(A)(3) (within three days).
19. Hazleton Ordinance, supranote 10, § 5(B)(3). As discussed in Section 1II.B.3 infra, there
is no federal database in existence which is capable of quickly verifying the legal status of every
person in the United States-citizen and noncitizen, immigrant and non-immigrant visitor-for
the purpose of determining whether they can enter into a residential lease.
20. Cherokee County Ordinance, supra note 12, § 18-504(d) (five days); Valley Park
Ordinance 1715, supra note 12, § 5(B)(4) (five days); Hazleton Ordinance, supra note 10, §5(B)(4)
(five days); Escondido Ordinance, supra note 12, § 16E-2(d) (ten days); Riverside Ordinance
2006-26, supra note 12, § 166-5(B)(4) (seven days).
21. Hazleton Ordinance, supra note 10, § 5(B)(4).
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fines are imposed for each separate subsequent violation. 22 A separate
violation occurs each day that an unauthorized adult remains in the
unit, and for each such individual in the unit, starting on the day after
the landlord receives the violation notice. 23 A separate violation also
occurs each day beyond the allotted time that the landlord fails to
provide identifying data for a resident after a request from the Code
Enforcement Office. 24 A few municipalities also allow incarceration as
25
a potential penalty.
Most Hazleton-style All ordinances contain a "safe harbor"
provision for the landlord. Upon the landlord's own initiative (i.e., not
in response to a complaint) the landlord may seek verification of any
tenant's or prospective tenant's immigration status. 26 The landlord
does so by providing the city with information about a tenant or
applicant. The city contacts the federal government, which carries out
the verification in the same way that it does in response to a
complaint. 27 If a person's immigration status is verified as lawful, this
will shield the landlord from future liability with respect to that
tenant (if, for example, the tenant's status later changes to
unauthorized, or if the initial verification was incorrect).
2. Pre-authorization
Some AII ordinances require registration or "pre-authorization"
before individuals can even enter into a residential lease. For example,
under Valley Park's ordinance, landlords must apply to the City for an
occupancy permit each time they rent out a unit and when the
22. Id. § 5(B)(8) (imposing $250 fine per violation). Other municipalities imposed similar or
harsher penalties. Farmers Branch Ordinance, supra note 12, § 6 (imposing a fine of $500 per
violation); Valley Park Ordinance 1715, supra note 12, § 5(B)(8) (imposing $250 fine per
violation); Escondido Ordinance, supra note 12, § 16E-2(g) (imposing a fine of up to $1,000 per
day by referring to the penalties permitted under Escondido Municipal Code 16-249); Riverside
Ordinance 2006-26, supra note 12, § 166-5(B)(7)(imposing a fine of at least $1,000 and up to
$2,000 per offense).
23. Hazleton Ordinance, supranote 10, § 5(A)(2). There appears to be a discrepancy here, as
the ordinance gives the landlord five days to cure the violation before his rental license is
suspended, but only one day before the fines start accruing. Compare id. § 5(A)(2), with id. §
5(B)(4).
24. Id. § 5(A)(3).
25. Escondido Ordinance, supra note 12, § 16E-2(h) (referring to the penalties permitted
under Escondido Municipal Code 16-249, which allows for imprisonment for up to six months);
Riverside Ordinance 2006-26, supra note 12, § 166-5(B)(7) (allowing for a term of imprisonment
not to exceed 90 days).
26. Hazleton Ordinance, supra note 10, § (5)B(9).
27. It is not clear what information the landlord must provide to the City in order for the
landlord-initiated verification to take place, but presumably it is similar to the information that
the landlord must supply in response to a complaint.
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proposed occupancy of a unit changes. 28 The application requires the
landlord to set forth the "names, ages, citizenships, and relationships"
of each proposed resident, as well as additional "identifying
information that shall be required by the City. ' 29 If any prospective
tenant is a noncitizen, the city will verify with the federal government
whether that person is lawfully present in the United States before it
30
will issue an occupancy permit.
Under Hazleton's ordinance, the prospective
tenants
themselves are required to apply to the city for an occupancy permit
for each person who will reside in the dwelling. 3 1 Applicants must
provide "proper identification showing proof of legal citizenship and/or
residency." 32 This part of the statute does not contain a procedure by
which the city verifies the person's status with the federal
government, and it is not clear whether city employees will make
33
some determination about the applicant's legal status.
The Farmers Branch ordinance mandates that landlords
"require as a prerequisite to entering into any lease or rental
arrangement, including any lease or rental renewals or extensions, the
34
submission of evidence of citizenship or eligible immigration status."
It further prohibits landlords "from allowing the occupancy of any unit
by any family which has not submitted the required evidence of
citizenship or eligible immigration status."35 The statute does not
specify who evaluates this evidence and makes the final decision as to
whether a person's immigration status is sufficient to allow rental,
36
though it appears these decisions are left to the landlord.

28. Valley Park Ordinance 1721, supra note 12, § 2(a).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 2006-13 § 7(b)(1) (Aug. 15, 2006), available at
http://clearinghouse.wustl.edu/detail.php?id=5472.
32. Id. § 7(b)(1)(g).
33. Hazleton has another ordinance, 2006-40, that amends the complaint procedure
ordinance, 2006-18, which states, "At no point shall any City official attempt to make an

independent determination of any alien's legal status, without verification from the federal
government." Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 2006-40 § 7(E) (Dec. 13, 2006), available at
http://clearinghouse.wustl.eduldetail.php?id=5472. In light of this, it appears that such a query
would be submitted to the federal government.
34. Farmers Branch Ordinance, supra note 12, § 3(B).
35. Id. § 3(B)(4)(ii).
36. See Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, 496 F. Supp. 2d 757, 771
(N.D. Tex. 2007) ("[Blefore a landlord can even enter into a lease or rental agreement, the
landlord must take the necessary first step of requiring the submission of documentation related
to citizenship or immigration status.").
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Under all pre-authorization provisions, if a landlord rents to a
person who does not have an occupancy permit, he is subject to fines
37
that can accrue rapidly.
C. Preemption:Hazleton and Beyond
The few courts that have ruled on All ordinances have struck
the housing provisions down on either federal or state preemption
grounds. 38 The most significant opinion thus far has been Hazleton, in
which the court struck down Hazleton's All housing provisions on
federal conflict preemption grounds.
Because federal law is largely silent on how immigration status
affects housing, the Hazleton court first determined that statutory
field preemption was not applicable to immigration-related housing
restrictions.3 9 The only provision of federal immigration law that even
tangentially relates to housing is the "harboring" provision, which
penalizes any person who "knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact
that an alien has come to, entered, or remained in the United States
in violation of the law, conceals, harbors, or shields from detection...
such alien in any place, including any building . ...- 40 It is not at all
clear that the term "harboring"-which implies both an intent to help
a person hide from authorities and an intent to help a person remain
in the United States-is meant to apply to landlords who simply rent
out apartments. 4 1 The courts have split on the issue of what

37. See, e.g., Hazleton Ordinance, supra note 10, § 10(b) (imposing a fine of $1,000 for each
occupant who lacks a permit, plus $100 per day for each day that the landlord is out of
compliance).
38. Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, Nos. 3:06-CV-2371-L, 3:06-CV2376-L, 2008 WL 2201980, at *5-13 (N.D. Tex. May 28, 2008) (issuing permanent injunction
against local ordinance on federal preemption grounds); Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp.
2d 477, 530-33 (M.D. Pa. 2007) (enjoining local ordinance permanently as preempted by federal
law); Reynolds v. City of Valley Park, No. 06-CC-3802, 2007 WL 857320 (Mo. Cir. Ct. St. Louis
County Mar. 12, 2007) (enjoining ordinance because it conflicted with state landlord tenant law
and because the penalties it imposed were greater than municipalities of its class could impose

under state law).
39. Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 521-25. Statutory field preemption exists when Congress
has manifested the intent to clearly occupy the field through legislation, leaving no room for
states to legislate, even when such state legislation would be harmonious with the federal
statute. De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 356-58 (1976).
40. 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii) (2000).
41. Black's Law Dictionary defines "Harboring an Illegal Alien" as "the act of providing
concealment from detection by law-enforcement authorities or shelter, employment, or
transportation to help a noncitizen remain in the United States unlawfully, while knowing about
or recklessly disregarding the noncitizen's illegal immigration status." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
733 (8th ed. 2004) (emphasis added).
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constitutes harboring, 42 although as Huyen Pham points out, in every
case where this question was presented, the defendant had more
connection with the illegal immigrants than merely providing housing
to them in a typical landlord-tenant relationship. 43 Although the
federal courts have all interpreted the "harboring" provision in a
manner that probably does not cover the landlord-tenant relationship,
all of the All ordinances incorporated the "harboring" language from
the federal statute into their housing provisions, and each defined the
term to include renting an apartment to an unauthorized person. 44 For
example, Escondido's ordinance defined "harboring" to include "to let,
lease, or rent a dwelling unit to an illegal alien, knowing or in reckless
disregard of the fact that an alien has come to, entered, or remains in
the United States in violation of law." 45
With field preemption unavailing, the Hazleton court next
looked to conflict preemption, and it found that this doctrine is
applicable to immigration-related housing restrictions. 46 It determined
that Hazleton's ordinance conflicted with federal immigration law in
its assumption that all people who lack documentation of their legal
status have no right or ability to remain in the United States (and by
extension, in Hazleton). The reality, the court noted, is much more
complicated. First, someone who clearly seems to be an "illegal
alien"-a person who knowingly entered the country without legal
permission or who remains in the country after legal permission
expires-is only deportable if and when an immigration law judge
issues a deportation order after a formal hearing. 47 There are also a
42. Compare United States v. Acosta De Evans, 531 F.2d 428, 430 (9th Cir. 1976)
(construing "harbor" to mean "afford shelter to"), and United States v. Lopez, 521 F.2d 437, 441
(2d Cir. 1975) (broadly interpreting the term "harboring" to include "providing of shelter to"),
with Susnjar v. United States, 27 F.2d 223, 224 (6th Cir. 1928) (holding that the defendant must
have acted with intent to shield the undocumented immigrant from detection).
43. Pham, supra note 3, at 792.
44. See, e.g., Escondido Ordinance, supra note 12, § 16E-l(a) (incorporating harboring
language).
45. Id.; see also Hazleton Ordinance, supra note 10, § 2(E) (citing the federal harboring
provision, stating that "the provision of housing to illegal aliens is a fundamental component of
harboring"); Valley Park Ordinance 1715, supra note 12, § 2(E) (same); Cherokee County
Ordinance, supra note 12, § 1, 8 (same); Riverside Ordinance 2006-26, supra note 12, § 1662(F) (same).
46. Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 525-29 (M.D. Pa. 2007). Conflict
preemption occurs when subfederal governments are free to legislate because Congress has not
preempted the field, but something about the legislation conflicts with federal law. See De Canas
v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 358 n.5 (1976) (explaining when conflicting law is preempted).
47. Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 533. "[T]here is no assurance that a [person] subject to
deportation will ever be deported. An illegal entrant might be granted federal permission to
continue to reside in this country, or even to become a citizen. In light of the discretionary federal
power to grant relief from deportation, a State cannot realistically determine that any particular
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number of circumstances under which persons can be technically out
of status (i.e., without documents proving they have permission to be
in the United States) but still be permitted to stay in the United
States.48 Finally, there are circumstances under which a judge may
find that a person who is deportable may nonetheless remain in the
49
United States.
Therefore, the court concluded that the ordinance, which
required landlords and code enforcement offices to deny housing to
anyone who could not produce documentary evidence of legal status,
conflicted with federal law requiring immigration law judges or the
Attorney General to make individualized status determinations. 50
Thus, the ordinance was conflict preempted and was struck down. 51
The Northern District Court of Texas in Villas at Parkside
Partners v. City of Farmers Branch,52 in contrast, did not reach the
issue of field versus conflict preemption. Instead, it decided the case
based on the odd drafting of the Farmers Branch AII ordinance. 5 3 The
Farmers Branch ordinance incorporated the legal status restrictions
used by the Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD")
to determine eligibility for federal housing assistance. 54 Essentially,
Farmers Branch required landlords to deny housing to anyone who
would not, for legal status purposes, be able to receive federal housing
subsidies. 55 Because there are several categories of noncitizens who

undocumented [person] will in fact be deported until after deportation proceedings have been
completed." Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 226 (1982).
48. For example: (1) aliens who have completed an application for asylum or withholding of
removal; (2) aliens who have filed an application for adjustment of status to lawful permanent
resident; (3) aliens who have filed an application for suspension of deportation; (4) aliens paroled
into the United States temporarily for emergency reasons or reasons deemed strictly in the
public interest; (5) aliens who are granted deferred action as "an act of administrative
convenience to the government." 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)
8-11, 14 (2008).
49. For example, relief from removal may be obtained by spouses and other relatives of U.S.
citizens, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1154, 1229b (2000), victims of domestic violence, id. § 1229b(b)(2), and those
seeking protection from persecution or torture under the Convention Against Torture, id. §
1231(b)(3); 8 C.F.R. § 208.16-18. Additionally, the U.S. Attorney General may cancel removal in
the case of an alien who is inadmissible or deportable from the United States if the alien: (1) has
been an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence for not less than 5 years; (2) has resided
in the United States continuously for 7 years after having been admitted in any status; and (3)
has not been convicted of any aggravated felony. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b.
50. Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 525-29.
51. Id. The court also raised Due Process concerns because of the lack of a hearing or
meaningful appeals procedure under the scheme set forth in the ordinance. Id. at 537-38.
52. Nos. 3:06-CV-2371-L, 3:07-CV-0061-L, 2008 WL 2201980, at *19 (N.D. Tex. May 28,
2008).
53. Id.
54. Id. at *9.
55. Id. at *7.
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may be legally present in the United States yet ineligible for federal
housing assistance (such as tourists, workers, students, and
diplomats), the ordinance effectively substituted a different scheme for
determining the "conditions under which a legal entrant may remain"
in the United States by preventing such individuals from residing in
Farmers Branch. 56 In addition, the court found that the ordinance
placed responsibility for the determination of immigration status with
landlords, who were likely to make ad hoc judgments, instead of with
immigration authorities, who would conform to the federal
immigration scheme.5 7 Thus, the court determined that the Farmers
Branch ordinance likely constituted an impermissible "regulation of
immigration" in violation of the rule set forth by the Supreme Court in
De Canas v. Bica 58 and permanently enjoined enforcement of the
59
ordinance.
Although it is tempting for immigrant rights advocates to take
solace in these two district court opinions and assume that preemption
doctrine will thwart further municipal attempts at passing AII
housing ordinances, preemption is a risky and unsatisfying approach
for several reasons. First, there is no guarantee that future courts will
find these ordinances preempted. The FarmersBranch ruling appears
to be limited to its facts, 60 and it is entirely possible that future courts
will break with Hazleton and find that local AII housing provisions are

56. Id. at *7-10.
57. Id. at *11-13.
58. 424 U.S. 351, 351 (1976). De Canas held that the "[p]ower to regulate immigration is
unquestionably exclusively a federal power." Id. at 354. De Canas defined "regulation of
immigration" as "a determination of who should or should not be admitted into the country, and
the conditions under which a legal entrant may remain." Id. at 355; see also Takahashi v. Fish &
Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 419 (1948) ("The Federal Government has broad constitutional
powers in determining what aliens shall be admitted to the United States, the period they may
remain, regulation of their conduct before naturalization, and the terms and conditions of their
naturalization."). Because the power to regulate immigration is plenary, any state statute
deemed a regulation of immigration must be struck down without the need for the court to look
to the doctrines of field and conflict preemption. See De Canas, 424 U.S. at 354 (explaining
breadth of federal power).
59. Farmers Branch, 2008 WL 2201980, at *13. The court also found that the ordinance
violated Due Process because it was impermissibly vague. Specifically, the ordinance failed to
adequately inform the landlords who were subject to it about what acts were prohibited because
of its confused descriptions of the meaning of "eligible immigration status" and lack of guidance
with respect to documentation requirements. Id. at *16-17.
60. Indeed, Farmers Branch recently enacted a new version of its ordinance, Ordinance
2952, that fixes the drafting problems which led the court to determine that the ordinance
impermissibly regulated immigration. Specifically, the new ordinance removes all references to
the standards for eligibility for housing assistance set forth by HUD. Farmers Branch Ordinance
2952
(Jan. 22,
2008),
available at http://www.ci.farmers-branch.tx.us/sites/default/
files/Ordinance%2ONo%202952.pdf.
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not preempted at all. 61 Express field preemption is clearly out of the
question given the absence of federal law on immigration-related
housing restrictions. Implied field preemption is also problematic
because while the power to regulate immigration has historically been
a federal prerogative, states and municipalities have long been
recognized to possess the authority to regulate housing as part of their
police power. 62 This power, with some limits, enables municipalities to
regulate the identities of who can reside in rental housing. For
example, zoning laws that restrict occupancy of certain areas to
"single families" have been consistently upheld, so long as "family" is
63
not defined in an overly restrictive way.

61. Courts have recently broken with Hazleton in holding that the employment provisions
of All ordinances, which the Hazleton court found to be field preempted, are not preempted by
federal law. See Arizona Contractors Ass'n, Inc. v. Candelaria, Nos. CV07-02496, CV07-02518,
2008 WL 343082, at *6-7 (D. Ariz. Feb. 7, 2008) (finding state statute not preempted); Gray v.
City of Valley Park, No. 4:07CV00881, 2008 WL 294294, at *9-12 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 31, 2008) ("The
statute at issue is such a licensing law, and therefore is not expressly preempted by the federal
law."). It should be noted that both of the laws at issue made suspension or revocation of
business licenses the only sanction for offending employers, and that IRCA contains an express
exception from preemption for "licensing and similar laws." 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2) (2000).
62. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 145-46 (1963) (holding that
partial congressional superintendence of a field does not foreclose ability of state to impose its
own regulations, particularly when such regulation was part of the state's police power).
Longstanding doctrine holds that states and municipalities have the police power to regulate
housing through land use and zoning. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365,
386-95 (1926). Currently, virtually every municipal and county government in the country
exercises these powers, and the majority of all housing-related decisions are made by local
governments. See Tim Iglesias, Housing Impact Assessments: Opening New Doors for State
Housing Regulation While Localism Persists, 82 OR. L. REV. 433, 437 (2003) ("[Llocal
governments make most of the important housing decisions. They largely decide what housing
will be developed, how much of it, what kind, and where.").
63. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas is perhaps the strongest endorsement of this municipal
power. 416 U.S. 1, 1 (1974). The case involved a group of six unrelated college students who
sought to live together in Belle Terre, N.Y. Id. They challenged a village zoning ordinance that
limited the entire village to single-family occupancy. Id. The Court deferred to the Village's
authority to use its zoning power to address "family needs," and guarantee families a safe, quiet
"sanctuary" away from the noise, traffic, and filth that come with higher density population. Id.
at 9 (concluding that it is a permissible goal "to lay out zones where family values, youth values,
and the blessings of quiet seclusion and clean air make the area a sanctuary for people"). This
power will give way to constitutional concerns such as family privacy if it is exercised in such a
way as to prevent people who are related from living with one another. See Moore v. City of East
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 512 (1977) ("[T]he municipality is constitutionally powerless to
abridge ... the freedom of personal choice of related members of a family to live together."). This
case is discussed infra at notes 187-88 and accompanying text. Other common examples of
"human zoning" are the restrictions that some municipalities and states place on where sex
offenders can live. Currently, some twenty states and over 400 local governments have zoning
ordinances which limit where registered sex offenders can live. MARCUS NIETO & DAVID JUNG,
CALIFORNIA RESEARCH BUREAU, THE IMPACT OF RESIDENCY RESTRICTIONS ON SEX OFFENDERS
AND CORRECTIONAL MANAGEMENT PRACTICES: A LITERATURE REVIEW 21 (2006), available at
http://www.library.ca.gov/crb/O6/O8/O6-OO8.pdf. These ordinances typically prevent a sex offender
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In order for conflict preemption to be appropriate, there must
be an "impossibility of dual compliance" 64 with both state and federal
law. Impossibility of dual compliance may not be the case with All
housing provisions. For instance, a court may determine that All
ordinances do nothing more than place the burden on noncitizens to
prove their legal status. Currently, any noncitizen who lacks
documentation of her legal status is subject to arrest and detention by
federal immigration authorities until her status can be determined. If
she lacks status, her deportability is adjudicated. So, the argument
might go, the All ordinances merely target people who already have
the burden of proving that they are legally present under the federal
scheme. The All ordinances do not grant noncitizens the ability to
remain in the United States or require their deportation; they merely
prevent such individuals from entering into a lease until their status
65
is determined.
Moreover, whether because of political gridlock, the complexity
issue,
or the enormity of the problem, the federal government
of the
has not effectively prevented unauthorized people from entering the
country or removed those who do. Meanwhile, local communities are
faced with the practical task of absorbing influxes of immigrants, legal
and otherwise. 66 The community's housing stock, schools, workplaces,
and hospitals are directly affected by such demographic changes. As a
result, local governments will invariably continue to take action-in
ways that may be either pro- or anti-immigrant. In light of this
reality, it is unsatisfying to dismiss these attempts as being outside
67
the constitutional scope of their powers.

from living within a certain distance from schools, day care centers, playgrounds, or parks. Such
ordinances have routinely been upheld by courts.
64. FloridaLime & Avocado Growers, 373 U.S. at 143.
65. Courts have refused to find conflict preemption in cases where preemption seemed
much more plausible than in the AI situation. See, e.g., Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S.
238 (1984) (holding that Federal Atomic Energy Act did not preempt state tort action against
nuclear power company); FloridaLime & Avocado Growers, 373 U.S. at 142-43 (holding that a
federal law prescribing standards for the maturity of Florida avocados did not preempt a
California statute that required a stricter standard for avocados grown in California).
66. Cristina Rodriguez refers to this as the "de facto obsolescence of federal exclusivity."
Rodriguez, supra note 3, at 576.
67. A growing body of scholarship argues against a strict focus on preemption, either as a
practical or as a constitutional matter. See Huntington, supra note 5, at 792 (arguing that the
Constitution allows immigration authority to be shared among levels of government); Rodriguez,
supra note 3, at 596 ("[C]ourt decisions that reject state and local efforts outright as ultra vires,
instead of approaching potential preemption questions narrowly, thwart what should be an
ongoing dialogue about these issues at the state and local levels."); Schuck, supra note 5, at 64
(arguing against federal exclusivity as a functional matter); cf. Olivas, supra note 5, at 35
(having previously made the case against subfederal attempts to enforce immigration law,
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Even if courts deem the area preempted on a state level, it is
quite possible that there will be a move at the federal level to
empower (or require) subnational governments or individual landlords
to implement or enforce All housing measures.6 8 Peter Spiro argues
that if state and local governments are prevented from dealing with
immigration-related issues, they will turn to the federal government
69
to effect change on the national stage.
There are several ways this could happen. Congress could pass
legislation giving individual landlords a role to play, as it did with
employers under the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986
("IRCA"), 70 which provided for sanctions against employers who
employ individuals who are not work authorized. Congress could also
pass legislation giving states leeway to act within defined parameters,
as it currently does with welfare benefits under the Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996
("PRWORA"), which authorizes states to determine noncitizen
71
eligibility for federal and state-funded benefit programs.
Alternately, Congress may create cooperative agreements
between federal authorities and local code enforcement officials. These
agreements would be similar to the so-called "287(g) agreements"
created by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996 ("IIRIRA"). 72 Under section 287(g), the
Secretary of Homeland Security can enter into agreements with state
and local law enforcement agencies to enforce federal immigration
laws; federal officials train and supervise municipal employees, who
are then authorized to investigate immigration cases and arrest and
73
detain individuals for violations.
shifting his argument to say that such efforts are bad as a matter of public policy, and will lead
to a degradation of enforcement efforts at all levels).
68. Peter Schuck refers to the general tendency of federal programs to rely on state and
local involvement as the "federalist default arrangement," Schuck, supra note 5, at 65, and notes
that "the movement toward devolution is extremely powerful," Peter Schuck, Some Federal-State
Developments in Immigration Law, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 387, 387 (2002).
69. Spiro, supra note 3, at 1628-39. Spiro refers to this as the "steam-valve" theory of
immigration federalism. He argues that in many cases immigrant-rights supporters might prefer
to let individual states impose restrictions on immigrants rather than force a situation where
frustrated citizens in one state press for tough nationwide measures.
70. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)-(h) (2000).
71. Id. § 1612(b)(1).
72. Id. § 1357(g).
73. Id. There is a good deal of scholarship on whether such agreements are constitutionally
permissible and/or sound public policy. Compare Huyen Pham, The ConstitutionalRight Not to
Cooperate?Local Sovereignty and the Federal Immigration Power, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 1373, 140912 (2006) (arguing such agreements should be subject to a balancing test between strict scrutiny
and rational basis), Huyen Pham, The Inherent Flaws in the Inherent Authority Position: Why
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In light of these very real possibilities, scholars and advocates
should move beyond a narrow focus on preemption as a way to defeat
All ordinances and instead analyze the substantive issues raised by
these ordinances. This inquiry, as I approach it for the housing
provisions, contains two components: First, if such ordinances are
enforced, what are the likely results, and how might these results
conflict with federal housing discrimination law? Second, regardless of
whether specific federal law violations result, are All housing
measures sound as a matter of public policy?

II. PROBABLE RESULTS OF All HOUSING ORDINANCES
A. Multiple Groups Likely to Be Affected
All housing measures present a strong likelihood of
discrimination against all national origin minorities, regardless of
citizenship or legal status. This is due in part to the slippery nature of
national origin as a legal concept and how it relates to perceptions of
"foreignness." National origin is a protected characteristic in most civil
rights statutes and constitutes a suspect class worthy of strict scrutiny
in Equal Protection jurisprudence. 4 The Supreme Court has defined
national origin as "the country where a person was born, or, more
broadly, the country from which his or her ancestors came. '" 75 National
origin, therefore, need not refer to the country from which the
individual in question recently immigrated. It can also refer to
ancestry, although it is not at all clear how far back this ancestry can
or must be traced, 76 or what happens if a person's ancestors have
emigrated more than once.

Inviting Local Enforcement of ImmigrationLaws Violates the Constitution, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
965, 987-91 (2004) (arguing the immigration power is an exclusively federal power that must be
exercised uniformly), and Michael J. Wishnie, State and Local Police Enforcement of
Immigration Laws, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1084, 1095 (2003) (arguing that enforcement of federal
immigration rules is "reserved for federal officials"), with Kris W. Kobach, The Quintessential
Force Multiplier: The Inherent Authority of Local Police to Make Immigration Arrests, 69 ALB. L.
REV. 179, 199 (2005) (arguing such agreements are constitutional).
74. See, e.g., Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (noting that governmental
classifications based on race or national origin are given "the most exacting scrutiny").
75. Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 88 (1973).
76. Technically, of course, all people living in the United States today, with the exception of
"pure-blooded" Native Americans, can trace their ancestry back to another country. Juan Perea,
Los Olvidados: On the Making of Invisible People, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 965, 988 (1995) ("[The truth
is that every American has an ancestry, traced far enough back in time, that began in another
place or nation.").
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It seems clear that when most people speak of national origin,
what they mean is ethnicity, which refers to physical and cultural
characteristics that make a social group distinctive, either in group
members' eyes or in the view of outsiders. 77 Without access to a
person's birth certificate or family tree, it is impossible to know with
certainty what country she or her ancestors come from. Instead we
rely on ethnic markers such as language, accent, surname, cultural
and religious practices, and race or "ethnic appearance" (itself a
difficult to define term) to identify a person with a particular region of
the world. Thus, national origin discrimination is less likely to consist
of discrimination motivated by the fact that a person or her ancestors
came from a particular country, and it is much more likely to consist
of discrimination based on ethnic characteristics with regional
associations. 78 Juan Perea uses a particularly apt term, "manifest
ethnicity," to describe people whose appearance, accents, or other
79
observable traits identify them with a particular country or region.
In this Article, I will use the terms "national origin minorities" and
"ethnic minorities" to refer to individuals of manifest ethnicity.
National origin minorities, even those who are citizens and
whose families have been living in the United States for generations,

77.

See JOE R. FEAGIN, RACIAL AND ETHNIC RELATIONS 11-12 (3d ed. 1989) (discussing the

meaning of "ethnic group"). There is a frequent overlap between national origin and race. For
example, "Asian" is considered a racial category, but specific subgroups within this category,
such as Korean or Vietnamese, are described in terms of national origin. Thus, discrimination
against a Korean will frequently be classified as discrimination based on both race and national
origin. The designation of Latino (or Hispanic), in contrast, refers only to a national origin group.
Latinos can be of any race.
78. This has led some scholars to call for a re-imagining of national origin-based
discrimination as discrimination based on ethnic traits. See, e.g., Stephen M. Cutler, A TraitBased Approach to National Origin Claims Under Title VII, 94 YALE L.J. 1164, 1164 (1985)
(calling the current approach "virtually meaningless" and suggesting courts should "consider the
heterogeneity that exists within a single national origin group"); Juan Perea, Ethnicity and
Prejudice: Reevaluating "National Origin" Discrimination Under Title VII, 35 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 805, 809 (1994) ("The increasingly visible Latino, African-American, and Asian populations
of this country invite reexamination of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and its adequacy
as a legal tool for redressing the present and future forms of discrimination likely to be
experienced in a more diverse workforce." (citation omitted)).
79. Perea, supra note 78, at 806. The more manifest these ethnic traits are, and the more
they distinguish a person from "mainstream" America, the more likely they are to serve as a
basis for discrimination. Neil Gotanda also uses an apt term, "racialized foreignness," which
applies to particular groups who have had culturally embedded racial profiles constructed for
them, implying foreignness and unassimilability. Neil Gotanda, Comparative Racialization:
Racial Profiling and the Case of Wen Ho Lee, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1689, 1698-1703 (2000). A rich
literature exists on the racialization of ethnicity and national origin, which is outside the scope of
this Article.
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are still commonly perceived as foreigners.80 Poll data show that
people overestimate dramatically the likelihood that Latinos who live
in the United States are here illegally.8 1 Anecdotal evidence
demonstrates that even police officers and government officials may
82
assume wrongly that Latinos are both foreign and undocumented.
This tendency to engage in stereotyping and make erroneous
assumptions about ethnic minorities may in fact be hardwired into our
cognitive processes. Social psychologists have long observed the
human tendency to categorize other people into groups and to make
83
assumptions about individuals based on their "group membership."
80. See Robert S. Chang & Keith Aoki, Centering the Immigrant in the Inter/National
Imagination, 10 LA RAZA L.J. 309, 311 (1998) (noting that some immigrants "remain perpetual
foreigners" (citation omitted)); Robert S. Chang, Toward an Asian American Legal Scholarship:
Critical Race Theory, Post-Structuralism, and Narrative Space, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1241, 1258
(1993) (remarking that "many non-Asian Americans persist in thinking of Asian Americans as
foreign"); Pat K. Chew, Asian Americans: The Reticent Minority and Their Paradoxes, 36 WM.&
MARY L. REV. 1, 33-38 (1994) (noting how Asian Americans' physical appearance and
immigration history has affected how they are perceived as foreigners); Neil Gotanda, Other
Non-Whites in American Legal History: A Review of Justice at War, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1186,
1188 (1985) (referring to the "persistence of the view that even American-born non-Whites were
somehow 'foreign' "); Kevin R. Johnson, The New Nativism, in IMMIGRANTS OUT! 165, 180 (Juan
F. Perea ed., 1997) [hereinafter Johnson, The New Nativism] (noting that "[r]egardless of
citizenship status, members of minority groups not infrequently are treated as foreign and unAmerican"); Kevin R. Johnson, Racial Hierarchy, Asian Americans and Latinos as "Foreigners,"
and Social Change: Is Law the Way to Go?, 76 OR. L. REV. 347, 352-58 (1997) (discussing the
treatment of Asian and Latino immigrants in the United States); Perea, supra note 76, at 988-98
(discussing the role the "national origin" concept plays in the identity of immigrants as
outsiders).
Professor Chang describes an incident in which he tried to cross the border to the United
States after a brief visit to Canada. Chang, Toward an Asian American Legal Scholarship,supra,
at 18. Even though all that was required at that time for a U.S. citizen to re-enter was a valid
driver's license, the border guard insisted on seeing Chang's passport. Id. The guard obviously
imposed more stringent requirements upon Chang because he thought of Chang as foreign, while
he allowed Caucasian drivers to cross the border with only a driver's license. Id.
81. See WASH. POST/KAISER FAMILY FOUND./HARVARD UNIV. SURVEY PROJECT, NATIONAL
SURVEY
ON
LATINOS
IN
AMERICA
98
(2000),
http://www.kff.org/kaiserpolls/loader.

cfm?url=/commonspot/security/getfile.cfm&PageID=13509
(finding fifty-seven
percent of
respondents believed that the majority of Latinos immigrating to the United States in the
previous decade were illegal immigrants). The actual percentage of those illegally present was
twenty-five percent. Michael A. Fletcher, Poll Finds Latinos are Objects of Negative Perceptions,
NEWARK STAR-LEDGER, May 29, 2000, at A7. A 1993 survey revealed a similar disparity. See Joe
R. Feagin, Old Poison in New Bottles, in IMMIGRANTS OUT!, supra note 80, at 13-43 (describing
the 1993 survey in which two-thirds of respondents believed that most immigrants enter the
United States illegally, while the actual percentage entering illegally is twenty-five percent).
82. See Ann M. Simmons, Latinos in New Orleans Suburb Feel Slighted, L.A. TIMES, Sept.
20, 2005, at All (describing FEMA's failure to provide emergency housing to legal Latino
residents of severely damaged housing complex after Hurricane Katrina, and quoting FEMA
official as saying that "part of the problem with the Hispanic community is that if you are illegal,
you cannot apply for housing").
83. Linda Krieger provides a thorough analysis of this phenomenon and its significance for
civil rights law in her influential article, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias
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These group-based stereotypes are absorbed typically during
childhood and reinforced by social and cultural influences throughout
a person's life.8 4 Individuals tend to make stronger stereotyped
assumptions about group outsiders, and people (predictably) tend to
assess members of their own group more favorably.8 5 People also tend
to remember information that conforms to these stereotypes and to
disregard information that does not. 6 Research demonstrates that
people even "misremember" information that conflicts with
stereotypes.8 7 The bias, therefore, becomes self-reinforcing and
stronger over time.

Approach to Discriminationand Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 11861217 (1995). A number of studies in the social psychology literature have demonstrated the
tendency of the human brain to categorize and stereotype. See, e.g., Richard D. Ashmore &
Frances K. Del Boca, Conceptual Approaches to Stereotypes and Stereotyping, in COGNITIVE
PROCESSES IN STEREOTYPING AND INTERGROUP BEHAVIOR 1, 1-12 (David. L. Hamilton ed., 1981)
(discussing the history of stereotype research and theory); Henri Tajfel & A.L. Wilkes,
Classificationand QuantitativeJudgment, 54 BRIT. J. PSYCHOL. 101, 104, 113 (1963) (describing
experiment in which subjects exaggerated some differences across groups, but minimized
differences within groups); W. Edgar Vinacke, Stereotypes as Social Concepts, 45 J. SOC.
PSYCHOL. 229, 229 (1957) (recognizing the "considerable body of research" that had accumulated
on the nature of stereotypes).
84. Lu-in Wang, Race as Proxy: Situational Racism and Self-Fulfilling Stereotypes, 53
DEPAUL L. REV. 1013, 1044-45 (2004).
85. See Arnd Florack, Martin Scarabis & Herbert Bless, When Do Associations Matter? The
Use of Automatic Associations Toward Ethnic Groups in PersonJudgments, 37 J. EXPERIMENTAL
SOC. PSYCHOL. 518, 518 (2001) (noting that most studies of automatic associations toward ethnic
groups revealed "a clear ethnic bias"); see also Nilanjana Dasgupta, Implicit Ingroup Favoritism,
Outgroup Favoritism, and Their Behavioral Manifestations, 17 SOC. JUST. RES. 143, 147-48
(2004) (discussing research on ingroup favoritism); Samuel L. Gaertner & John P. McLaughlin,
Racial Stereotypes: Associations and Ascriptions of Positive and Negative Characteristics,46 SOC.
PSYCHOL. Q. 23, 28 (1983) (reporting experiment in which Caucasian subjects were discovered to
be more likely to ascribe positive characteristics to Caucasians than African-Americans). The
tendency to make favorable assumptions about one's own group is present even when
assignment to groups is arbitrary. See Marilynn B. Brewer, In-Group Bias in the Minimal
Intergroup Situation: A Cognitive-Motivational Analysis, 86 PSYCHOL. BULL. 307, 308 (1979)
(discussing study where subjects were randomly assigned to an "X-group" and "Y-group" and
judged members of their own group more favorably).
86. Nancy Cantor & Walter Mischel, Prototypicalityand Personality: Effects on Free Recall
and PersonalityImpressions, 13 J. RES. PERSONALITY 187, 196-202 (1979) (describing the results
of an experiment in which the subjects recalled more information about persons matching a
personality type than those that did not). This phenomenon is typically referred to as "recall
bias." Cf. Mark Snyder, On the Self-Perpetuating Nature of Social Stereotypes, in COGNITIVE
PROCESSES IN STEREOTYPING AND INTERGROUP BEHAVIOR, supra note 83, at 190 ("Stereotypes
influence and guide the remembering and interpretation of the past in ways that support and
bolster current stereotyped interpretations of other people.").
87. See Nancy Cantor & Walter Mischel, Traits as Prototypes: Effects on Recognition
Memory, 35 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 38, 45 (1978) (describing experiment in which
twenty-six students were placed in group sessions and were presented slides that described a
fictional character and the students expressed "confidence that they had seen nonpresented but
conceptually related material").
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Because these processes occur at such a fundamental level of
cognition, people are often quite unaware that stereotypes affect the
way they perceive others.8 8 In fact, such unconscious bias commonly
affects the thought processes even of people who consciously reject
stereotypes.8 9 This bias can then translate into discriminatory
treatment unchecked by social norms that mitigate against
discriminatory behavior-because, of course, the actor does not
recognize himself as biased. 90 Social science evidence also tells us that
unintentional discrimination is particularly likely to occur in
situations where discriminatory behavior can be rationalized easily,
88. See, e.g., Patricia G. Devine, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Their Automatic and Controlled
Components, 56 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 5, 12 (1989) (reporting a study suggesting that
when an individual's ability to consciously monitor stereotype activation is precluded, both those
with high self-reported prejudice and those with low self-reported prejudice "produce stereotypecongruent or prejudice-like responses"); John F. Dovidio et al., On the Nature of Prejudice:
Automatic and Controlled Processes, 33 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 510, 517-18 (1997)
(reporting study in which "White participants responded faster to positive words following a
White prime than following a Black prime and faster to negative words following a Black [prime]
than following a White prime," despite the participants' self-reported level of racial bias); Daniel
T. Gilbert & J. Gregory Hixon, The Trouble of Thinking: Activation and Application of
Stereotypic Beliefs, J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 509, 510-11 (1991) (reporting experiment in
which subjects applied stereotypes in their descriptions of either a Caucasian or Asian female
assistant when they were asked to describe the assistant while quickly completing another task);
Anthony G. Greenwald & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Social Cognition:Attitudes, Self-Esteem,
and Stereotypes, 102 PSYCHOL. REV. 4, 15-16 (1995) (discussing implicit race and gender
stereotyping and defining "implicit stereotype" as "the introspectively unidentified (or
inaccurately identified) traces of past experience that mediate attributions of qualities to
members of a social category").
89. See Devine, supra note 88, at 12 (reporting study in which subjects with low levels of
self-reported bias displayed levels of bias similar to those with high levels of self-reported bias);
Dovidio et al., supra note 88, at 518 (reporting experiment that "offers further evidence of
implicit evaluation biases that may not be predicted from self-report measures of prejudice");
Gilbert & Hixon, supra note 88, at 515 (discussing experiment that suggests social interaction
causes individuals "to become cognitively busy and thus reduces the likelihood that their
stereotypes about each other will be activated"); Greenwald & Banaji, supra note 88, at 15
(discussing the results of a study on racial bias in which bias "occurred similarly for subjects who
scored high and for ones who scored low on a direct (i.e., standard self-report) measure of race
prejudice"). Unconscious bias is measured by using the Implicit Association Test, in which
subjects are asked to make rapid determinations about whether particular concepts should be
paired with particular attributes. Anthony G. Greenwald, Debbie E. McGhee & Jordan K.L.
Schwartz, Measuring Individual Differences in Implicit Cognition: The Implicit Association Test,
74 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1464, 1465-66 (1998). Longer response times for associating
a racial or ethnic group with positive traits and/or short response times for making a negative
association is considered indicative of bias. Id.; see also Bernd Wittenbrink, Charles M. Judd &

Bernadette Park, Evidence for Racial Prejudice at the Implicit Level and Its Relationship with
Questionnaire Measures, 72 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 262, 264 (1997) (reporting
experiment designed to examine the relationship between implicit and explicit associations of
Caucasians toward African-Americans).
90. This phenomenon is referred to as "aversive racism." Sam L. Gaertner & John F.
Dovidio, The Aversive Form of Racism, in PREJUDICE, RACISM, AND DISCRIMINATION 61, 61-63
(John F. Dovidio & Sam L. Gaertner eds., 1986).
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such as when the norms for what is appropriate (nonracist) behavior
are unclear or when there are nonracial justifications for the
discriminatory behavior. 91
This creates a "perfect storm" of factors leading to
discrimination in the AII housing context. Although most of the
ordinances provide for the federal government to check the legal
status of prospective tenants, for many practical reasons discussed in
the next Section, individual landlords have the incentive to undertake
their own evaluation of a prospective tenant's status. These landlords
will be immediately confronted with the difficulty inherent in
determining a person's legal status. It is impossible to discern legal
status from looking at a person. Such a determination requires
inspecting official immigration documents, which may be difficult for a
variety of reasons. There are multiple types of legal status9 2 and
dozens of documents that can demonstrate legal status. 93 A person's
status can change due to time or circumstances, and reliance on
documents is further complicated by the proliferation of difficult-todetect counterfeit documents.9 4 Thus, the desire to comply with the
91. Devine, supranote 88, at 15-16; Gaertner & Dovidio, supra note 90, at 67-68.
92. There are two main categories of noncitizens who may be legally present in the United
States. Non-immigrant visitors, who usually travel to the United States using visas, are
permitted to reside in the United States for specific periods of time and for specific purposes,
such as working for a particular employer or attending school. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(F), (H), (M)
(2000). Immigrants, on the other hand, are people who desire to remain in the United States
permanently. This group includes Permanent Resident Aliens (who are permitted to live and
work in the United States indefinitely), Conditional Permanent Residents (who must petition to
become Permanent Residents), and asylum-seekers and refugees (who enter the country without
documents to establish legal status and must take steps to legalize their presence). Id. §§
1101(a)(20), 1157-1158.
93. See, e.g., Pham, supra note 3, at 782 (noting that there is no "one definitive document
that establishes legal presence"). A review of the U. S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
website reveals that there are currently no less than seventy-five types of non-immigrant visas.
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis (last visited
Jan. 1, 2009). Some visitors may not possess visas because they come from countries that
participate in the State Department's Visa Waiver Program; currently, there are twenty-seven
countries that participate in this program. Visa Waiver Program, U.S. Dep't of State, Bureau of
Consular Affairs, http:// http://travel.state.gov/visa/temp/without/without_1990.html (last visited
Jan. 1, 2009). In addition, certain immigrants may also be initially present under visas, such as
family-based or employment-based visas. There are at least nine different visas for immigrants,
as well as the Permanent Resident Card (also known as an Alien Registration Receipt Card, and
commonly referred to as a "Green Card"), which is given to noncitizens who establish Permanent
Resident Alien status, and the Conditional Permanent Resident Card, which is similar to a
Permanent Resident Card but with a two-year expiration period. Immigration Classifications
Services,
and Immigration
Citizenship
U.S.
Immigrants,
Categories:
and Visa
(last visited Jan. 1, 2009) (search "immigration
http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis
classifications and visa categories"; access third result of search).
94. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REP. NO. GGD-99-33, ILLEGAL ALIENS: SIGNIFICANT
OBSTACLES TO REDUCING UNAUTHORIZED ALIEN EMPLOYMENT EXIST 10 (1999) [hereinafter 1999
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ordinances supplies a nonracial justification for discriminatory
behavior. Meanwhile, the confusion generated by the difficulty of
compliance creates a situation with unclear norms for appropriate
behavior. This is just the sort of ambiguous scenario in which
unconscious bias will flourish.
All of these factors make it highly probable that people who
attempt to comply with All ordinances will "overcomply" and
discriminate against national origin minorities who are citizens or
otherwise legally present in the United States. 95
A similar pattern of discrimination occurred two decades ago
after Congress enacted IRCA, which provided for sanctions against
employers who employ individuals who are not work authorized. 96
From the start, concerns were raised that IRCA's employer sanctions
would encourage employers to discriminate against national origin
minorities and any noncitizens who were work authorized. 97 In an
attempt to address potential problems with discrimination, Congress
included a provision making it illegal for an employer to discriminate
based on national origin or citizenship status. 98 Nonetheless, the
evidence demonstrated that the employer sanctions had exactly the
GAO REPORT], available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1999/gg99033.pdf (noting that fraudulent
employment eligibility documents are widely available due to large-scale counterfeiting); Thomas
C. Green & Ileana M. Ciobanu, Deputizing-and then Prosecuting-America'sBusinesses in the
Fight Against Illegal Immigration, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1203, 1206-07 (2006) (arguing that
counterfeit documents are the main reason for IRCA's failure to prevent the hiring of
unauthorized workers).
95. See Campbell, supra note 6, at 1052-53 (discussing housing); Matthew Parlow, A
Localist's Case for Decentralizing Immigration Policy, 84 DENV. U. L. REV. 1061, 1072 (2007)
(recognizing that All ordinances may violate the rights of U.S. citizens and legally admitted
aliens); Pham, supra note 3, at 822-24 (noting that employers may discriminate because they do
not understand the law); cf. Valerie L. Barth, Comment, Anti-Immigrant Backlash and the Role
of the Judiciary:A Proposalfor Heightened Review of Federal Laws Affecting Immigrants, 29 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 105, 113 (1997) (noting that the majority of victims of the discriminatory backlash
that followed the passage of California's Proposition 187 were U.S. citizens or legal immigrants,
not the illegal immigrants targeted by the initiative).
96. 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a) (2000).
97. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 99-132, at 9, 104, 109 (1986) (Sens. Kennedy and Simon stating
their concerns about increased levels of discrimination against "foreign looking or foreign
sounding individuals"); H.R. REP. No. 99-682(I), at 68 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5649, 5672 (reporting that witnesses at various congressional hearings expressed concerns that
employer sanctions would "cause extensive employment discrimination against HispanicAmericans and other minority group members"); Linda Sue Johnson, Comment, The AntiDiscriminationProvision of the Immigration Reform and Control Act, 62 TUL. L. REV. 1059, 1071
(1988) ("One of the most serious flaws of employer sanctions is that they will result in massive
discrimination not only against documented aliens, but also against United States citizens of
Hispanic origin and other minorities." (citation omitted)).
98. As discussed later in this Section, while national origin is a protected characteristic
under the Fair Housing Act, the statute contains no such protection against alienage
discrimination.
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discriminatory effect feared. A General Accounting Office ("GAO")
survey found that 10% of employers admitted to discriminating
against people based on language, accent, or appearance because of
fear of violating IRCA, and an additional 9% admitted to
discriminating on the basis of citizenship status.9 9 (The percentages
were higher in areas with large Latino and Asian populations.) This
amounted to approximately 891,000 employers who began
discriminating based on either ethnic traits or citizenship as a direct
result of the employer sanctions, leading the GAO to conclude that
IRCA was responsible for "a widespread pattern of discrimination"
against national origin minorities. 100 The U.S. Commission on
Immigration reform also found a
[Plattern of subjecting foreign-appearing workers to different or additional
requirements ... :employers selectively verify employment authorization for some, but
not other, employees, refusing to accept valid documents, requiring specific documents
from certain workers (such as a green card from everyone they believe to be an
immigrant), and accepting only a limited number of documents, such as a driver's
license and social security card. 101

Unconscious bias, confusion about the law's requirements, and
fear of punishment will almost certainly cause what I call
"discrimination slippage," which is discrimination against large
numbers of individuals who are not the targets of AII ordinances. The
situation is complicated by the fact that AII ordinances, while
ostensibly targeted at illegal immigrants, may well be motivated by
hostility to immigrants generally or animus against a particular
national origin group, regardless of legal status. 10 2 Of course, some AII

99. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REP. No. GGD-90-62, IMMIGRATION REFORM: EMPLOYER
SANCTIONS AND THE QUESTION OF DISCRIMINATION 39 (1990) [hereinafter 1990 GAO REPORT].
100. Id. at 8. Of course, this figure does not account for those employers who may have been
discriminating on the basis of ethnic trait or alienage all along, and thus the actual amount of
discrimination on these bases was undoubtedly higher.
101. U.S. COMM'N ON IMMIGR. REFORM, U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY: RESTORING CREDIBILITY
80 (1994). This practice, known as "document abuse," is specifically prohibited. 8 U.S.C. §
1324b(a)(6) (2000).
102. See, e.g., Parlow, supra note 95, at 1071 (recognizing that some of the motivating factors
behind All are "unsavory); Kenneth Juan Figueroa, Note, Immigrants and the Civil Rights
Regime: Parens Patriae Standing, Foreign Governments and Protection from Private
Discrimination, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 408, 416 (2002) (arguing that immigrants of manifest
ethnicity are likely to be targets of hostilities based on racial, ethnic, and cultural prejudice, as
well as prejudice based on alienage); Alex Kotlowitz, Our Town, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2007, § 6
(Magazine), at 33 (noting that in one jurisdiction contemplating an All ordinance, the
controversy "often seems less about illegal immigration than it does about whether new
immigrants are assimilating quickly enough"); cf. Marlin W. Burke, Reexamining Immigration:
Is It a Local or National Issue?, 84 DENV. U. L. REV. 1075, 1076-77 (arguing that much of the
debate about illegal immigration is generally motivated by fear "that the racial, religious, and
social make-up of our country is threatened" by immigration from Latin America).
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ordinance supporters wish to promote respect for the rule of law and
have genuine problems with the fact that unauthorized immigrants
have broken the law. They may worry justifiably that the presence of
unauthorized immigrants who lack automobile and health insurance
will burden the community, and that immigrants willing to work for
low wages will undercut the labor market for everyone else. They may
fear that allowing unauthorized immigrants to settle in their
community will only cause more to come. All of these concerns are
legitimate aspects of the debate over illegal immigration. However,
some of the sentiments expressed by supporters of AII measures are
targeted less at legal status and more at the cultural differences
between them and particular ethnic groups. 10 3
Put more bluntly, AII ordinances often seem motivated by the
desire of white residents to "get the Mexicans out of town." For
example, the mayor of Valley Park made public statements indicating
that the purpose of his city's AII ordinance was to prevent Latinos
from moving there: "You got one guy and his wife that settle down
here, have a couple kids, and before long you have Cousin Puerto Rico
and Taco Whoever moving in." 10 4 A city councilman and supporter of
the San Bernardino ordinance stated that he was motivated by
hearing Spanish spoken in check-out lines and a Wal-Mart ad
featuring a dark-haired family wearing Mexican soccer jerseys. 10 5 A
Farmers Branch city councilman described his motives for introducing
the All ordinance: "I saw our property values declining ... what I
would call less desirable people move into our neighborhoods, people
who don't value education, people who don't value taking care of their
10 6
properties."'
There is also significant anecdotal evidence that members of
the general public who favor All ordinances are motivated by antiimmigrant or anti-Latino sentiment as much as they are by the desire
to crack down on illegal immigration, or at the very least that they are

103. See Johnson, The New Nativism, supra note 80, at 179-80 (describing how support of
early anti-illegal immigrant measures often masked nativist opposition to all foreigners, or
people believed to be foreigners).
104. Kristen Hinman, Valley Park to Mexican Immigrants: "Adios, Illegals!", RIVERFRONT
TIMES (St. Louis), Feb. 28, 2007, at 1. In this article, the Mayor goes on to refer to Mexicans as
"beaners" and "wetbacks," and to describe how he first became a proponent of AII laws when a
Mexican family-all of whom were legally present in the United States-moved in next door to his
sister. Id.
105. See James Sterngold, San Bernardino Seeking "Relief", S.F. CHRON., June 11, 2006, at
A4 ("When," the councilman is quoted as asking, "does it become my America?").
106. Verified Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief at 8, Vazquez v. City of Farmers
Branch, No. 3-06CV2376-R (N.D. Tex. filed Dec. 26, 2006), available at http://clearinghouse.
wustl.edu/chDocs/public/IM-TX-0001-0001 .pdf.
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confused about these distinctions.1 0 7 For example, in Hazleton, a
Latino reporter (and American citizen) who was covering a rally held
in support of the ordinance was confronted by white protestors who
shouted at him to "get out of the country."1 0 8 Other lawfully present
Latinos report being told to get out of the United States by angry
mobs. 0 9 Thus, members of the general public may contribute to the
slippage by creating an atmosphere in which the terms "illegal
immigrant," "immigrant," and "ethnic minority" are conflated.
This Article will therefore proceed under the assumption that
AII housing provisions will have two effects. The first is the intended
effect, which is to prevent undocumented people from entering into
leases for, or residing within, rental housing. The second is the
(possibly) unintended, but highly likely, effect of increased housing
discrimination against all identifiable national origin minorities,
regardless of their citizenship or legal status, and against legally
present noncitizens.
B. Violations of the FairHousingAct Likely

1. Background
The primary federal statute aimed at preventing housing
discrimination is the Fair Housing Act ("FHA"). 110 The FHA prohibits
housing discrimination against individuals based on specific protected
characteristics. The most significant substantive provision in the FHA

107. See, e.g., id. (quoting an AII ordinance proponent as saying, "There's unemployment
partly because of the Hispanics. The lady who took my job is Hispanic, and she's bilingual," and
another as saying, "The education system is tanking, health care has gone through the roof,
everybody is bilingual."); Ellen Barry, City Vents Anger at Illegal Immigrants, L.A. TIMES, July
14, 2006, at Al (quoting a Hazleton waitress who describes being reprimanded by customers who
heard her speak Spanish and being told by a customer that he wanted Immigration to "take
away the Mexicans"). In Hazleton, a Latino opponent of the AII ordinance received racist hate
mail calling him "[s]ubhuman spic scum," and stating "[i]f it is brown, flush it down." Lozano v.
City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 510 (M.D. Pa. 2007).
108. The reporter had to be escorted from the rally by police for his own protection. Hazleton,
496 F. Supp. 2d at 510.
109. See, e.g., Rosita Johnson, Vigil, Lawsuits Challenge N.J. Town's Anti-Immigrant Law,
PEOPLE'S WEEKLY WORLD, Aug. 22, 2006 (describing how a Latino prayer vigil opposing
Riverside's AII ordinance was met by counter-demonstrators who displayed a Confederate flag
with the motto "The South Will Rise Again" and chanted "Go home!"), available at
http://www.pww.org/article/articleview/9722/; Michael Powell & Michelle Garcia, Pa. City Puts
Illegal Immigrants on Notice, WASH. POST, Aug. 22, 2006, at A3 (describing how whites who
attended a Hazleton City Council meeting on the AII ordinance chanted "hit the road, Jack" at
the Latinos present).
110. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619, 3631 (2000).
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is § 3604, of which several subsections are relevant to the discussion
here.
Section 3604(a) of the FHA makes it unlawful "[t]o refuse to
sell or rent ... or to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or
otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person"
because of a protected characteristic.'1 1 This applies both to initial
refusals to deal and to other actions-such as eviction-that deprive a

person of housing once she has secured

it.112

Section 3604(b) prohibits subjecting people who wish to obtain
housing to different "terms, conditions, or privileges" because of a
protected characteristic. 1 3 It can apply in a variety of situations, such
as where tenants are discriminatorily required to abide by different
lease terms or rules, provided different levels of service and
maintenance, subjected to harassment, or granted different privileges
1 14
related to the dwelling.
Section 3604(c) makes it unlawful "[t]o make, print, or publish,
or cause to be made, printed, or published any notice, statement, or
advertisement, with respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling that
indicates any preference, limitation, or discrimination" based on a
protected category, "or an intention to make any such preference,
limitation, or discrimination." This subsection applies to both oral and
11 5
written statements.
Section 3604(d) prohibits making false representations that a
dwelling is not available for inspection or rental, where the false
representation is made on a discriminatory basis. 116 Because such an
act will also make housing unavailable, violations of § 3604(d) will
usually violate § 3604(a) as well. The subsection does have
independent significance, however, because it gets around the
requirement contained in § 3604(a) that a "bona fide offer" to buy or
rent have been made. Section 3604(d) thus allows claims to be brought

111. Id. § 3604(a).
112. For a thorough discussion of this subsection and its application to different housing
scenarios, see ROBERT G. SCHWEMM, HOUSING DISCRIMINATION LAW AND LITIGATION §§ 13:113:16 (2007); Rigel C. Oliveri, Is Acquisition Everything? Protecting the Rights of Occupants
Under the FairHousingAct, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (2008).
113. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b).
114. For a thorough discussion of this subsection and its application to different housing
scenarios, see SCHWEMM, supra note 112, §§ 14:1-14:3; Oliveri, supra note 112, at 5-10.
115. For a thorough discussion of this subsection and its application to different housing
scenarios, see SCHWEMM, supra note 112, §§ 15:1-15:13; Oliveri, supra note 112, at 10-11;
Robert G. Schwemm, DiscriminatoryHousing Statements and § 3604(c): A New Look at the Fair
HousingAct's Most IntriguingProvision, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 187, 213-16 (2001).
116. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(d) (2000).
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by housing "testers" who pose as real applicants in order to detect
117
discriminatory practices.
Finally, § 3617 prohibits intimidating or interfering with a
person in the exercise or enjoyment of fair housing rights, or doing so
because a person has aided or encouraged another person in the
exercise or enjoyment of such rights. 118 The "exercise or enjoy"
language indicates three activities with which interference is
forbidden. 119 The first is the specific assertion of fair housing rights
(for example, filing a discrimination complaint with a federal
agency).1 20 The second is the simple act of seeking, obtaining, or
residing in housing on a nondiscriminatory basis. 121 The third type of
protected activity is assisting another person in exercising or enjoying
fair housing rights.1 22 This is essentially a third party claim: the
plaintiff is not the target of discrimination, but claims to have been
retaliated against for assisting a person who is targeted. 123 Housing
providers or their employees are often the plaintiffs who bring this
third type of § 3617 claim.124
1 25
National origin is a protected characteristic under the FHA.
However, neither alienage (whether or not a person is a U.S. citizen)
nor legal status (whether or not a noncitizen is legally present in the
United States, and, if so, under what type of status) are specified in
the statute. As a result, both public and private actors are largely free
to discriminate on these bases,1 26 at least as far as the FHA is
117. For a thorough discussion of this subsection and its application to different housing
scenarios, see SCHWEMM, supra note 112, §§ 16:1-16:2.

118. 42 U.S.C. § 3617 (2000).
119. See 24 C.F.R. § 100.400(c) (2008) (interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 3617).
120. 24 C.F.R. § 100.400(c)(5).
121. Id. § 100.400(c)(1)-(2).
122. Id. § 100.400(c)(3)-(4).
123. For a thorough discussion of this subsection and its application to different housing
scenarios, see SCHWEMM, supra note 112, §§ 20:1-20:6; Oliveri, supra note 112, at 11-12.
124. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Lee County Hous. Auth., 161 F.3d 1290, 1298-1308 (11th Cir.
1998) (employee); Sofarelli v. Pinellas County, 931 F.2d 718, 721-23 (11th Cir. 1991) (house
mover); Smith v. Stechel, 510 F.2d 1162, 1164 (9th Cir. 1975) (employee); People Helpers Found.,
Inc. v. City of Richmond, 789 F. Supp. 725, 731-33 (E.D. Va. 1992) (nonprofit housing provider);
People Helpers Found., Inc. v. City of Richmond, 781 F. Supp. 1132, 1133-36 (E.D. Va. 1992)
(same).
125. 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2000).
126. See, e.g., Martinez v. Partch, No. 07-cv-01237, 2008 WL 113907, at *2 (D. Colo. Jan. 9,
2008) (dismissing plaintiffs federal housing discrimination claims alleging her rental application
was denied solely on the basis of her citizenship status); Corwin v. B'Nai B'Rith Senior Citizen
Hous., Inc., 489 F. Supp. 2d 405, 409 (D. Del. 2007) ('The prohibition of discrimination based on
,national origin' does not prohibit discrimination on the grounds of citizenship."); Espinoza v.
Hillwood Square Mut. Ass'n, 522 F. Supp. 559, 568 (E.D. Va. 1981) (interpreting 42 U.S.C. §
3604(a) to "prohibito discrimination on the basis of national origin, but not alienage
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concerned. 27 Although both legal status and alienage may be loosely
correlated with national origin, 128 for legal purposes, neither is
considered congruent with national origin.
Thus, a landlord who wishes to discriminate against national
origin minorities may adopt a "citizens only" policy. He would still
discrimination"). In fact, the Farmers Branch city ordinance specifically noted that the FHA does
not contain any protection for alienage in its preamble. Farmers Branch Ordinance, supra note
12, pmbl. ("WHEREAS, the Fair Housing Act does not prohibit distinctions based solely on a
person's citizenship status."). It should be made clear that everyone, regardless of alienage or
legal status, is protected by the FHA's prohibition against national origin discrimination, and
undocumented status does not deprive a person of the ability to vindicate her rights in a court of
law. Cf. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976) (finding that unlawful immigrants are entitled
to constitutional protection from deprivation of life, liberty, and property without due process of
law, as afforded to them by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments); Lozano v. City of Hazleton,
496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 498-99 (M.D. Pa. 2007) (finding that unlawful immigrants still retain Due
Process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment). Thus, an undocumented person has a cause of
action under the FHA if she suffers housing discrimination on the basis of her Mexican national
origin, but not if she is discriminated against because she is undocumented or because she is not
a U.S. citizen.
127. A Reconstruction-era statute designed to protect the right to enter into contracts
(including residential leases), 42 U.S.C. § 1981, offers some protection against alienage-based
housing discrimination. However, this statute does not provide a complete solution. For one
thing, muddled precedent and uncertain legislative history make it less than clear whether §
1981, which was originally intended to prohibit public acts of discrimination based on race,
should be interpreted to prohibit private acts of alienage discrimination. See Aaron M. Danzig,
Note, The Scope of 42 U.S.C. § 1981: ProtectionAgainst PrivateAlienage Discrimination,11 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 527, 528-29 (1997) (noting circuit split on whether § 1981 prohibits private alienage
discrimination); Angela M. Ford, Comment, Private Alienage Discrimination and the
Reconstruction Amendments: The Constitutionalityof 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 49 U. KAN. L. REV. 457,
459 (2001) (noting multiple disagreements among courts and unclear legislative history for both
the original 1870 Act and the 1991 amendments). Compare Murtaza v. N.Y. City Health &
Hosps. Corp., No. 97-CV-4554, 1998 WL 229253, at *10 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 1998) (holding that §
1981 does not apply to alienage discrimination), and Rios v. Marshall, 530 F. Supp. 351, 360-61
(S.D.N.Y. 1981) (same), with Nagy v. Balt. Life Ins. Co., No. 99-1859, 2000 WL 718391, at *5 (4th
Cir., June 5, 2000) (holding that § 1981 applies to acts of alienage discrimination by private
parties), Anderson v. Conboy, 156 F.3d 167, 169 (2d Cir. 1998) (same), Duane v. Geico, 37 F.3d
1036, 1042-43 (4th Cir. 1994) (same), Martinez v. Partch, No. 07-cv-01237, 2008 WL 113907, at
*2 (D. Colo. Jan. 9, 2008) (same), Chacko v. Tex. A&M Univ., 960 F. Supp. 1180, 1191 (S.D. Tex.
1997) (same), Cheung v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 913 F. Supp. 248, 251
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (same), and Doe v. Edgar, No. 88 C 579, 1989 WL 91805, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 4,
1989) (same). The weight of this authority points in favor of such coverage. Even if § 1981 is
clearly held to prohibit private alienage discrimination, it is still an inferior tool to the FHA. The
most significant weakness is that disparate impact theory is not available for cases brought
under § 1981. See Gen. Bldg. Contractors Ass'n, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 386 (1982)
(holding that § 1981 only applies to intentional discrimination and not to "practices that merely
result in a disproportionate impact on a particular class"). As discussed in the following
paragraphs, disparate impact theory is often the most viable theory for bringing a national origin
case, because national origin discrimination frequently takes the form of discrimination based on
non-protected but related characteristics such as legal status, language, or ethnic traits.
128. A person who emigrates from another country (as opposed to having ancestors who did
so) is not a U.S. citizen unless she has been naturalized, and any noncitizen must have some
type of legal status which permits her to be in the United States.
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have to rent to ethnic minorities who are citizens but would be free to
discriminate against those who are not, even if they are legally
present in the United States. The noncitizens' only recourse under the
FHA would be to proceed under a disparate impact theory of
discrimination, alleging that the permissible ground for discrimination
(alienage) in fact operates to perpetuate discrimination on an
impermissible ground (national origin). 129 This would require the
plaintiff to demonstrate that the alienage discrimination caused a
significant disparate impact on a specific national origin minority
group. 130 Even if such a showing were made, the defendant would then
be permitted to argue that the discrimination has a legitimate
business justification. 131
Similarly, a landlord can institute a "legal residents only"
policy, and discriminate on the basis of legal status. A landlord could
also discriminate based on levels of legal status, for example, by
renting to lawful permanent residents but not those in the United
States on work visas. In addition, certain types of trait-based
discrimination-for example, the refusal to rent an apartment to a
Spanish speaker-may not be prohibited by the FHA, under the
129. Espinoza, 522 F. Supp. at 568 (allowing plaintiffs to proceed on the theory that alienage
discrimination was a pretext for national origin discrimination and had a disparate impact on
national origin minorities).
130. See SCHWEMM, supra note 112, §§ 10:4-10:6 (discussing disparate impact claims, and
discriminatory effect claims generally, and their requirements when brought under the FHA).
Although the Supreme Court has never officially endorsed the use of the disparate impact
theory in a fair housing case, there are several reasons to believe that the theory is a valid one in
this context. First, the Supreme Court has endorsed disparate impact as a theory in Title VII
cases, based on similar statutory language. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432
(1971) ("[Glood intent or absence of discriminatory intent does not redeem employment
procedures or testing mechanisms that operate as 'built-in headwinds' for minority groups and
are unrelated to measuring job capability."). Second, many federal courts of appeal have
endorsed the use of the theory in housing cases, and in two such cases, the Supreme Court
denied certiorari. Mountain Side Mobile Estates P'ship v. Sec'y of Urban Hous. & Dev., 56 F.3d
1243, 1250-51 (10th Cir. 1995); Casa Marie, Inc. v. Superior Court of Puerto Rico, 988 F.2d 252,
270 n.20 (1st Cir. 1993); Robinson v. 12 Lofts Realty, Inc., 610 F.2d 1032, 1036 (2d Cir. 1979);
Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1290 (7th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978); Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 146 (3d Cir. 1977);
United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1185 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S.
1042 (1975); United States v. Pelzer Realty Co., 484 F.2d 438, 443 (5th Cir. 1973). Third, this
trend was well underway, with numerous high-profile cases such as those listed above endorsing
disparate impact theory at the time Congress significantly amended the FHA in 1988.
Presumably, if Congress had disagreed with this trend it would have clarified the statute to
eliminate disparate impact.
131. See SCHWEMM, supra note 112, § 10:5, at 10-40 ("At this justification stage, the
dispositive issue is whether the defendant's practice 'serves, in a significant way, the legitimate
employment goals of the employer.' "). It is difficult to imagine what legitimate business reason a
landlord would have for refusing to rent to, say, a lawful permanent resident simply because she
was not a U.S. citizen, however it is possible that one could be articulated.
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theory that traits are not necessarily congruent with national
origin. 13 2 In such cases, plaintiffs who believe they have really been
discriminated against because of their national origin again must rely
on disparate impact theory.133
Thus, there is a gap in protection for national origin minorities,
who cannot be discriminated against because of their national origin
per se, but who can be discriminated against based on characteristics
associated with national origin. To some extent, this gap can be
attributed to the different goals of civil rights law and immigration
law. Immigration law relies by its nature on status distinctionscitizen versus noncitizen, varying levels of legal status, legal versus
unauthorized.1 3 4 As a result, it can easily conflict with civil rights
laws, which prohibit individuals and governments from making
distinctions based on national origin, yet may permit them to make
other types of distinctions (ethnic trait, alienage, and legal status)
135
that are related to national origin.

132. See VWles v. Lindow, No. CV-96-20245, 2000 WIL 1807851, at *1 (9th Cir. Nov. 1, 2000)
(upholding summary judgment for defendant landlord who had an admitted policy of refusing to
rent to non-English speakers).
133. Id. (upholding summary judgment for defendant, where plaintiff failed to demonstrate
that defendant's policy of not renting to non-English speakers had a disparate impact on Latinos,
and where defendant offered legitimate reasons for instituting such a policy). It is easier for
defendants to provide legitimate business reasons for legal status discrimination and certain
types of trait-based discrimination. For example, a landlord could argue that his refusal to rent
to non-immigrant visitors who are in the United States on visas is based upon the fact that such
people are virtually guaranteed to return to their home countries after a relatively short period
of time. Thus, he could claim, he has a reasonable fear that such people are more likely to leave
owing rent or to leave the property in poor condition and then abscond beyond his ability to
recoup what he is owed. Like the defendants in Vdles, a landlord who refuses to rent to people
who cannot speak English could argue that he must be able to communicate with his tenants in
order to do business with them. Id.
134. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 78-79 (1976) (finding that many "constitutional and
statutory provisions rest on the premise that a legitimate distinction between citizens and aliens
may justify attributes and benefits for one class not accorded to the other; and the class of aliens
is itself a heterogeneous multitude of persons with a wide-ranging variety of ties to this
country"). The Court noted in Mathews that "[t]he whole of Title 8 of the United States Code,
regulating aliens and nationality, is founded on the legitimacy of distinguishing between citizens
and aliens. A variety of other federal statutes provide for disparate treatment of aliens and
citizens." Id. at 79 n.12.
135. See Juliet Stumpf & Bruce Friedman, Advancing Civil Rights Through Immigration
Law: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back?, 6 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 131, 132 (2002)
(noting the tension between immigration law and civil rights law, and arguing that the
consequences of expanding immigration law enforcement into the private realm include an
increased potential for discrimination based on protected characteristics).
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2. Likely Fair Housing Act Violations
a. Private Landlords

In jurisdictions where the legal status of every prospective
tenant must be pre-verified, the landlord may face long delays during
the verification process (as well as any hearing that might be allowed
or required), only to learn that he cannot rent to the person after
all. 136 For the landlord who rents to a national origin minority, the
complaint-driven enforcement procedure means that the landlord
never knows when he will receive a complaint questioning the legal
status of one of his tenants. The various ordinances give the landlord a
relatively short time-anywhere between three and five days-to
collect the requested information and submit it to the city for
verification. If the verification comes back negative, the landlord has
just a matter of days to cure the violation at his own expense. Failure
to provide the information or commence eviction proceedings in the
requisite number of days exposes the landlord to loss of profits,
significant fines, and possibly jail time.
Faced with these bureaucratic obstacles' 37 and punitive
measures, a rational landlord may well refuse to deal with any person
who looks, sounds, or seems foreign.13 8 While the motivation for
refusal would be a fear of punishment or a desire to avoid bureaucracy
and delay, the decision itself would be based on the landlord's
assessment of the prospective tenant's national origin or ethnicity.
This would violate § 3604(a) of the Fair Housing Act, which prohibits
refusing to rent to, or otherwise making housing unavailable to, a
person based on national origin. The landlord (wisely) might not tell
136. As discussed in Section III.B.3 infra, there is currently no single federal database for
municipalities to use in order to verify a person's legal status in order to determine their
eligibility to rent an apartment. The experience of those using the federal databases in place to
verify employment eligibility, however, indicates that in some circumstances, delays could take
weeks. See infra notes 254-55.
137. In other contexts, the desire to avoid bureaucratic requirements can justify a landlord's
withdrawal from or refusal to participate in federal housing subsidy programs, even where such
withdrawal has a disparate impact on minorities. See, e.g., Graoch Assocs. #33, L.P. v.
Louisville/Jefferson County Metro Human Relations Comm'n., 508 F.3d 366, 377-78 (6th Cir.
2007) (involving landlord's withdrawal from Section 8 voucher program of the federal Subsidized
Housing Program); Salute v. Stratford Greens Garden Apartments, 136 F.3d 293, 300-01 (2d
Cir. 1998) (involving apartment manager's refusal to lease apartment to prospective, disabled
residents because of their desire to utilize Section 8 subsidies).
138. Cf. Johnson, supra note 97, at 1072-73 (arguing that statutory penalties encourage
employers to "play it safe" by refusing to hire people who look or sound like aliens); see also 1990
GAO REPORT, supra note 99, at 38 (describing discriminatory reactions by employers trying to
avoid sanctions under IRCA).
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the applicant that he refuses to deal with her because she appears to
be Latina and he doesn't want to take a chance that she is
undocumented. Instead, he might use the benign-sounding excuse that
there are no units available. If untrue, this would violate § 3604(d),
which prohibits making false statements about unavailability based
on national origin.
A landlord who does not wish to turn away all apparent
foreigners but who still fears the anti-immigrant ordinance may
instead take advantage of the "safe harbor" provision by requesting
prospective tenants' documentation. There are multiple problems with
this scenario. First, in order to avoid impermissible discrimination, a
landlord must request such documentation from all prospective
tenants, not just those who seem foreign or who the landlord suspects
are unlawfully present. One can imagine how tempting it would be for
a landlord to request documents from a dark-skinned person named
Jos6 Gonzales who speaks with a Mexican accent, but not to make a
similar request from a blond-haired person named Bob Smith who
speaks with a South Carolina drawl. Similarly, a landlord may feel
compelled to request documentation from a Latino applicant with a
Hispanic accent (under the assumption that such a person is probably
not here legally), and not from a Caucasian applicant with a British
accent (under the assumption that Britons are more likely to come
here legally). To do either of these things, however, would violate
§ 3604(b) of the Fair Housing Act, which prohibits discrimination
based on national origin in the terms and conditions of housing.
Application requirements are considered a "term or condition of
housing"; requiring some tenants and prospective tenants to undergo
additional or more onerous application requirements than others
based on a protected characteristic has been found to violate
139
§ 3604(b).
The landlord may also try to undertake his own evaluation of a
prospective tenant's legal status. In addition to the problems described
above, this scenario presents other dangers. 14 0 A landlord untrained in
deciphering the intricacies of immigration documents is very likely to
evaluate the documents incorrectly. A landlord who is presented with
documents he does not recognize and who faces punishment for
renting to an undocumented alien is likely to err on the side of caution
139. See, e.g., HUD v. Joseph, Fair Housing-Fair Lending Rep. (P-H) 25,072 (HUD A.L.J.
1994) (finding landlord violated § 3604(b) by requiring credit checks for black applicants but not
for white applicants); HUD v. Jerrard, Fair Housing-Fair Lending Rep. (P-H)
25,005 (HUD
A.L.J. 1990) (same).
140. Indeed, the Farmers Branch ordinance appears to require landlords to make this
assessment. Farmers Branch Ordinance, supra note 12.
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and refuse to rent to the person presenting the unfamiliar
documentation. This outcome is even more likely if the landlord fears
14 1
counterfeit documents and is unschooled in how to detect them.
A landlord who does ultimately rent to a person who seems
foreign may well feel the need to watch this tenant more carefully and
scrutinize her guests to ensure that undocumented friends and
relatives are not staying in the unit. In addition, because a person's
legal status may change over time, the landlord may feel the need to
make repeated requests for updated documentation from foreignseeming tenants. Again, these scenarios would violate § 3604(b),
which prohibits landlords from treating tenants differently based on
national origin. For example, in United States v. Sea Winds of Marco,
Inc., the court found that plaintiffs stated a claim under § 3604(b)
when they alleged that their condominium association required
Latinos-and only Latinos-to wear wristbands identifying them as
142
residents of the complex.
In all landlord-tenant interactions in which a landlord
attempts to ascertain legal status, requests documents, or seeks
identifying information, the landlord must be very careful. He is at
great risk of running afoul of § 3604(c), which prohibits making
statements that evince discrimination based on a protected
characteristic. Because there is no requirement that an offending
statement be made "because of' a protected characteristic, this part of
the statute is often referred to as a strict liability provision; 143 it does
not require that a defendant be motivated by any improper purpose or
141. Cf. 1999 GAO REPORT, supra note 94, at 6 (indicating that confusion about how to
determine eligibility and the prevalence of counterfeit documents led to employment
discrimination against national origin minorities); Johnson, supra note 97, at 1072 (noting that
employers who have any doubt about the legitimacy of a person's documents are likely to refuse
to hire the person). Recall that such situations-with uncertain norms and conflicting
obligations-are precisely the sort of scenarios in which unconscious bias is likely to result in
discriminatory behavior. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
142. 893 F. Supp. 1051, 1055 (M.D. Fla. 1995). It should be noted that there is some
disagreement over whether existing residents of housing can bring claims under § 3604(b) of the
Fair Housing Act. While it had long been assumed that such claims were cognizable under that
portion of the statute, a recent decision in the Seventh Circuit, Halprin v. Prairie Single Family
Homes, held otherwise. 388 F.3d 327, 329 (7th Cir. 2004) ("The Fair Housing Act contains no
hint either in its language or its legislative history of a concern with anything but access to
housing."). The Fifth Circuit has followed suit. See Cox v. City of Dallas, 430 F.3d 734, 745 (5th
Cir. 2005) (holding that, in a claim of discriminatory provision of services, § 3604(b) is
inapplicable where the service was not connected to the sale or rental of a dwelling). For a
discussion of this controversy and the Halprin and Cox decisions, see generally Oliveri, supra
note 112; Robert G. Schwemm, Cox, Halprin, and DiscriminatoryMunicipal Services Under the
Fair Housing Act, 41 IND. L. REV. 717 (2008); Aric Short, Post-Acquisition Harassment and the
Scope of the FairHousing Act, 58 ALA. L. REV. 203 (2006).
143. See Schwemm, supra note 115, at 215-16.
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intend his remark to be discriminatory. Simply making a remark that
indicates preference or discrimination is sufficient to violate the
statute.
Under some circumstances, merely inquiring as to someone's
place of birth, national origin, or citizenship may violate § 3604(c). For
example, in Housing Rights Center v. Donald Sterling Corp., the new
management of an apartment complex required tenants to apply for
parking spaces in the garage. 144 The application form required the
tenants to state their country of birth, citizenship, and naturalization
date. The court found that such questions, with no obvious connection
to a person's ability to qualify for a parking space, indicated
impermissible national origin bias and violated § 3604(c). Similarly, in
Jancik v. HUD, a landlord's telephone query as to the race of a
potential tenant was found to violate § 3604(c) because there was no
1 45
legitimate reason for him to seek such information.
Of course, in the previous cases, the landlord's inquiries related
directly to a protected characteristic and had no bearing on the
tenant's qualifications to rent an apartment or obtain a parking space.
Under the All ordinances, the tenant's national origin is still
technically irrelevant but her legal status is suddenly highly relevant.
If landlords are careful and phrase their questions only in terms of
legal status, they may not violate this portion of the law. However,
laypersons without a lawyer's understanding of the distinctions
between national origin, alienage, and legal status are likely to slip
up.
Moreover, blatantly discriminatory or offensive terms or
phrases are not required to violate § 3604(c)-the subsection can be
violated by the use of any term or phrase that "indicates"
discrimination. This means that landlords must steer clear of using
"catch phrases" or "code words" that might suggest discrimination
based on national origin, such as asking whether someone is "from
around here" or where his or her accent is from.' 46 A landlord who is
144. 274 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1141-43 (C.D. Cal. 2003), aff'd, 84 F. App'x 801 (9th Cir. 2003).
145. 44 F.3d 553, 557 (7th Cir. 1995); see also Soules v. HUD, 967 F.2d 817, 824 (2d Cir.
1992) (noting in dicta that "there is simply no legitimate reason for considering a[] [housing]
applicant's race" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
146. In 1972 HUD adopted a set of "Advertising Guidelines for Fair Housing," in which it set
forth phrases and terms that might constitute a § 3604(c) violation if used in a discriminatory
context. These included terms such as "restrictive," "integrated," and "white home." These
Guidelines were issued in the form of a Regulation in 1980, but removed by HUD from the Code
of Federal Regulations in 1996 because HUD stated that it wished to provide such guidance in a
different format. Thus far, HUD has failed to do so, and its original Guidelines remain a source
of useful guidance in applying § 3604(c). For a thorough discussion of discriminatory indicators
and the HUD Guidelines, see SCHWEMM, supra note 112, at §§ 15:3, 15:5.
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trying to ascertain someone's legal status could easily slip up and use
a term or phrase that is later found to be discriminatory.
The complaint-driven enforcement procedure also poses serious
risks of channeling the discriminatory sentiments of some members of
the general public. Complaints can be made by anybody and are far
more likely to be made against identifiable national origin minorities
who look or sound foreign. 47 Most Hazleton-style ordinances state
that complaints that allege a violation based on race, national origin,
or ethnicity are invalid. 148 Yet it is difficult to imagine what other
information someone like a neighbor would have on which to base a
complaint. Latinos are particularly likely to be targeted, both because
of the anti-Latino animus that surrounds most All ordinances and
because people are more likely to believe mistakenly that Latinos are
in the country illegally. 49 If a landlord repeatedly requests
information and documents from national origin minorities in
response to complaints, he may violate § 3617 of the FHA, which
prohibits interfering with a person's right to enjoy housing free of
discrimination. 150 If a landlord is repeatedly confronted with
complaints about his tenants and hassled by members of the
community, this may dissuade him from renting to national origin
minorities. 151 If the landlord persists in renting to national origin
minorities and community members continue to complain, the
complaining community members might be violating § 3617 with
respect to the landlord, because they are interfering with his ability to
assist others in enjoying housing free of discrimination.

147. See, e.g., Hinman, supra note 104, at 1:
The ink was hardly dry on the [Valley Park] ordinance when some
residents.., began making anonymous calls to the St. Louis County Police
Department, asking them to investigate certain homes for illegals. Officers
responded by knocking on a handful of doors-sometimes late at night-and
asking Hispanics to furnish proof of legal residency in the United States.
148. See, e.g., Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 2007-6, § 4(B)(2) (Mar. 21, 2007), available at
http://www.aclupa.org/downloads/hazletonord607.pdf.
149. See WASH. POST/KAISER FAMILY FOUND./HARVARD UNIV. SURVEY PROJECT, supra note

81. For information on anti-Latino sentiment in areas with AII ordinances, see supra notes 10209 and accompanying text. Of course, any national origin minority group that has recently
arrived in large numbers, thus causing a backlash from the existing residents, may be targeted.
150. 42 U.S.C. § 3617 (2000). Similarly, the complainants may be liable for violating § 3617,
particularly if they file multiple complaints. See, e.g., HUD v. Simpson, Fair Housing-Fair
25,082 (HUD A.L.J. 1994), 1994 WL 497538, at *4-6, 14 (Sept. 9, 1994)
Lending Rep. (P-H)
(finding a couple violated § 3617, in part, by repeatedly filing complaints against their Peruvian
neighbor with the local code enforcement authorities).
151. See, e.g., Guadalupe T. Luna, Immigrants, Cops and Slumlords in the Midwest, 29 S.
ILL. U. L.J. 61, 77 (2005) (discussing the burdens that some landlords face when they rent to
Latinos, in the form of increased targeting by city officials for housing code violations).
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The previous paragraphs describe how the threat of
punishment and the hassle and delay of verifying a noncitizen's legal
status can incentivize landlords to discriminate, even when they may
harbor no discriminatory intent. For landlords who want to
discriminate against national origin minorities, however, antiimmigrant ordinances provide great cover, especially given the
prevalence of counterfeit documents. A landlord can easily make the
pretextual claim that he refused to rent to a Latina apartment-seeker
not because of her national origin, but because he thought she was
here illegally, or because her documents looked funny.
In addition, some national origin minorities-and others-who
are citizens may lack the necessary papers to document their
citizenship, as well as the citizenship of everyone in their household.
Approximately one in twelve low-income U.S.-born adults do not have
a passport or birth certificate in their possession. More than one in ten
such individuals do not have such documents for at least one of their
children. 152 This amounts to approximately 3.2 to 4.6 million citizens
nationwide whose housing would be jeopardized if they were required
153
to show documentary evidence of their legal status.
To summarize: AII ordinances require landlords to treat
tenants and applicants for housing differently based on a factor-legal
status-that is very difficult to discern with precision upon first
encountering a person and may be difficult to establish even after
reviewing that person's relevant documents (if such documents are
available). In the face of bureaucratic hurdles and possible sanctions,
many landlords subject to All ordinances will likely resort to
shortcuts. Such landlords may instead treat tenants and applicants
differently based on ethnic markers. This results in two related
harms: (1) increased housing discrimination against millions of
national origin minorities who are either U.S. citizens or otherwise
legally present noncitizens and (2) placing landlords at risk of
violating the Fair Housing Act.
That there are two groups of people harmed by AII
ordinances-those pressured to engage in illegal discrimination and
those likely to be discriminated against-should not be overlooked. It

152. LEIGHTON KU, DONNA COHEN Ross & MATT BROADDUS, CTR. ON BUDGET AND POLICY
PRIORITIES, SURVEY INDICATES DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT JEOPARDIZES MEDICAID COVERAGE FOR 3
TO 5 MILLION U.S. CITIZENS 1 (2006), http://www.cbpp.org/1-26-06health.pdf.

153. Id.; see also William R. Tamayo, When The "Coloreds" Are Neither Black nor Citizens:
The United States Civil Rights Movement and Global Migration, 2 ASIAN L.J. 1, 19 n.126 (1995)
(describing how, after the employer sanctions were created by the IRCA in 1986, it was noted
that low-income African-Americans were negatively affected because they were less likely to
have documents verifying their citizenship).
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appears that landlords fear AII ordinances as much as national origin
minorities and immigrants do because of the likelihood that
attempting to comply will expose them to liability under the Fair
Housing Act. In all lawsuits brought to challenge the All ordinances,
landlords have been named plaintiffs or participated as amici,
underscoring the bind in which the All ordinances place them. A
group of apartment owners in Escondido, for example, argued that the
AII ordinance would:
[1]mmediately and adversely impair their ability to conduct their business and
professions by placing them in a prototypical "no-win situation." They must either
attempt to comply with the unlawful ordinance, thereby inviting an incalculable number
of lawsuits brought on behalf of their current and prospective tenants for violations of
federal and state housing, antidiscrimination,
and privacy laws, or face the Ordinance's
1 54
draconian punishment provisions.

A number of landlords have made similar arguments in other
1 55
cases challenging AII ordinances.

b. Municipalities
By passing and enforcing anti-immigrant ordinances,
municipalities themselves may violate the Fair Housing Act under two
different theories. The first is a direct theory. There is a good
argument that under any scheme that requires a municipal employee
to register or pre-authorize tenants, the municipality discriminates
against national origin minorities. Just as individual landlords are
unlikely to be skilled in interpreting immigration documents and are
subject to bias, so are municipal code enforcement employees.
If municipal employees single out national origin minorities
and either deliberately or mistakenly deny them the ability to qualify
for rental housing, this constitutes a denial of housing in violation of
§ 3604(a). If they impose different requirements on such individualssuch as extra document checks or delays-this could violate § 3604(b),
depending on whether the court considers these actions to be

154. Brief for San Diego Apartment Ass'n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiffs at 3,
Garrett v. City of Escondido, 465 F. Supp. 2d 1043 (S.D. Cal. 2006) (No. 06-cv-2434-JAH-NLS),
available at http:/lclearinghouse.wustl.edu/chDocs/public/IM-CA-0001-0005.pdf.
155. See Complaint
52, Stewart v. Cherokee County, No. 1:07-cv-0015 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 4,
2007),
available
at
http://clearinghouse.wustl.edu/chDocs/publicIM-GA-0001-O001.pdf;
Complaint 67, Riverside Coal. of Bus. Persons & Landlords v. Township of Riverside, No. 1:06cv-05521-RMB-JS (N.J. Sup. Ct. Oct. 18, 2006), available at http://clearinghouse.
wustl.edu/chDocs/public/IM-NJ-0001-0001.pdf, Petition for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief
19(h), Reynolds v. City of Valley Park, No. 06-CC-03802 (Mo. Cir. Ct. St. Louis County Sept. 22,
2006), availableat http://clearinghouse.wustl.educhDocs/public/IM.MO-0001.0003.pdf.
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connected to the rental of housing.156 And if they make discriminatory
national origin-based statements, they risk violating § 3604(c) if a
court deems these statements to be connected to the rental of
15 7
housing.
A municipality might also be liable to landlords under the
provision of § 3617 that protects people from retaliation for aiding
others in their ability to enjoy housing free of discrimination. If a
municipality penalizes a landlord for failing or refusing to comply with
an All ordinance-for example, if the landlord refuses to request extra
documentation from his Latino tenants after receiving a complaintthe landlord could have a cause of action against the municipality for
retaliation.
The second argument for municipal liability would proceed
under a disparate impact theory. The reasoning is that a municipality
violates §§ 3604(a) and (b) and § 3617 by adopting ordinances or by
enforcing statutes in ways that will disproportionately harm national
origin minorities by causing them to be denied housing, subjected to
discriminatory terms and conditions, and harassed based on their
national origin. Although others engage in the discrimination or
harassment, the municipality is potentially liable for setting up the
legal framework leading to these results.
There is a circuit split on the proper test for determining
disparate impact for municipal actions. The more complicated test is
set forth in Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. v. Village of
156. Section 3604(b) requires that the discriminatory terms and conditions occur "in
connection with the sale or rental of housing." 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) (2000). As a result, courts and
commentators (me included) have concluded that this subsection, as a general matter, can only
be violated by someone who has some degree of control over another person's housing situation.
Most of the time, this person will necessarily be a homeseller, housing provider, or other housing
professional (such as a real estate agent). See Oliveri, supra note 112, at 42 (observing that,
barring unique circumstances, § 3604(b) will not apply to someone who is neither a housing
provider nor professional, and citing cases in support). This situation presents an exception to
the general rule, however, because the All ordinances put municipal employees in control of the
terms and conditions by which a person may obtain rental housing.
157. Section 3604(c) requires that the statement be made "in connection with the sale or
rental of housing." 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c). As with § 3604(b), discussed in the previous note, the
argument could be made that only people who are themselves engaged in the sale or rental of
housing are capable of making statements "in connection with the sale or rental of housing." See
Oliveri, supra note 112, at 44-45. Courts, however, have generally taken a broad view of this
requirement. See, e.g., United States v. Space Hunters, Inc., 429 F.3d 416, 424 (2d Cir. 2005)
(refusing to limit § 3604(c) to property owners or their agents); Mayers v. Ridley, 465 F.2d 630,
649 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (applying § 3604(c) to the municipal Recorder of Deeds under the theory that
he is engaged in the commercial real estate market). But see Woodward v. Bowers, 630 F. Supp.
1205, 1209 (M.D. Pa. 1986) (finding that Recorder is not engaged in the sale or rental of housing,
and so is not covered by § 3604(c)). In this case, it is likely a court would find that the All
ordinances make the statements of municipal employees sufficiently connected to the rental of
housing to fall under § 3604(c).
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Arlington Heights158 and is followed by the Fourth, Sixth, Seventh,
and Ninth Circuits. The test requires balancing four factors: (1)
whether there is a disparate impact on a protected group; (2) whether
there is any evidence that the municipal action is, in fact, intentional,
or motivated in any part by discriminatory animus; 159 (3) whether
there is a legitimate economic or public safety rationale for the
municipality's action; and (4) whether the plaintiff is requesting that
the municipality provide her with housing, or whether she merely
wishes for the municipality to stop interfering with her ability to
160
obtain housing for herself.
Application of the Arlington Heights test reveals that in many
cases, a municipal defendant could be liable for passing an All
housing ordinance. Whether the first factor, disparate impact, is
satisfied will depend on the statistical evidence in a given case. If (as I
assume) Latinos are shown to be significantly more likely to
experience discrimination as a result of the ordinance, then this factor
cuts in favor of liability.
As for the second factor, intentional discrimination, there may
be evidence that All ordinances are motivated both by animus against
illegal immigrants and by animus against ethnic and national origin
minorities. As discussed previously, while there are legitimate reasons
for communities to be concerned about illegal immigration, there is
evidence that some of the All ordinances were passed in the wake of
significant anti-Latino sentiment, as expressed by municipal leaders
(recall the mayor of Valley Park's "Cousin Puerto Rico and Taco
whoever" statements) and private citizens.1 61 This also weighs toward
liability.
Whether the municipality can satisfy the third factor, a
legitimate economic or public safety rationale, will depend on the
quality of the municipality's justifications for the ordinance. The
courts do not apply traditional Equal Protection scrutiny levels to

158. 558 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1977).
159. The level of intentionality that suffices to satisfy this prong is much less than that
required to prove a violation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or some other statute that requires
intentional discrimination. This is because the whole theory of disparate impact is premised on
the notion that the policy or practice at issue was not undertaken for discriminatory reasons. The
Arlington Heights formulation merely uses incidental evidence of purposeful discrimination as
one factor that indicates the disparate impact is impermissible. Similarly, the absence of
evidence of intentional discrimination satisfies this prong, but is not in and of itself sufficient to
vitiate the plaintiffs case. Id. at 1292.
160. Id. at 1290-93.
161. See supra notes 102-09 and accompanying text.
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these justifications, and they appear to vary in how closely they will
analyze the defendant's proffered explanation.162
Many of the reasons cited for passage of All ordinances are
demonstrably false, have no supporting evidence, or cannot be traced
to illegal immigrants. For example, Hazleton's ordinance stated that it
was adopted because "[i]llegal immigration leads to higher crime
rates, subjects our hospitals to fiscal hardship and legal residents to
substandard quality of care, contributes to other burdens on public
services ...and diminishes our overall quality of life." 163 The court,
however, observed that (1) the city had provided no evidence that
crime had increased; (2) crime had, in fact, decreasedin Hazleton; and
(3) even if crime had increased by 10%, as was asserted at oral
argument, the city failed to produce any evidence that this increase
was connected to illegal immigration.164 The Farmers Branch
ordinance offers an even more extreme example of the disconnect
between justifications and reality. The sole justification cited for the
city's All housing restrictions was the terrorist attacks of September

11,

2001.165

The assertion that All housing measures fight terrorism is

162. CompareArlington Heights, 558 F.2d at 1293:
[I]f the defendant is a governmental body acting outside the scope of its
authority or abusing its power, it is not entitled to the deference which courts
must pay to legitimate governmental action. On the other hand, if the
defendant is a governmental body acting within the ambit of legitimately
derived authority, we will less readily find that its action violates the Fair
Housing Act.
(citation omitted), with Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 939
(2d Cir. 1988) (stating that "a defendant must present bona fide and legitimate justifications for
its action with no less discriminatory alternatives available"), aff'd per curiam, 488 U.S. 15
(1988).
163. Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 2006-18, § 2(C) (Sept. 12, 2006), available at http://
In addition, Hazleton's Mayor
clearinghouse.wustl.educhDocs/public/IM-PA-0001-001O.pdf.
made a number of statements indicating that his primary motivation in supporting the
ordinance was the increase in crime that illegal immigrants had caused in Hazleton. Barry,
supra note 107.
164. Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 459 F. Supp. 2d 332, 336 (M.D. Pa. 2006). Similarly, Valley
Park declared that it needed to pass its AII ordinance because "[i]llegal immigration leads to
higher crime rates, subjects our hospitals to hardship and legal residents to substandard quality
of care, contributes to other burdens on public services, increasing their costs and diminishing
their availability to legal residents, and diminishes our overall qualify [sic] of life and provides
concerns to the security and safety of the homeland." Valley Park Ordinance 1715, supra note 12,
§ 2(C). However, prior to enacting the ordinance, the City Council conducted no research into the
size of Valley Park's population of immigrants or illegal immigrants. At the same time, there was
no evidence that crime had increased or that schools were overcrowded. Hinman, supra note 107,
at 1.
165. See Farmers Branch Ordinance, supra note 12, pmbl. ("WHEREAS, in response to the
widespread concern of future terrorist attacks following the events of September 11, 2001,
landlords and property managers throughout the country have been developing new security
procedures to protect their buildings and residents").
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a stretch, to say the least, one that depends on the assumption that
most potential terrorists (1) are present in the United States illegally
and (2) will be deterred from their plans if they experience difficulty
166
renting an apartment.
In terms of the third factor, enforcement of AII housing
restrictions would frequently undermine the stated public health and
economic goals behind the restrictions. As discussed in greater detail,
infra, many of the ordinances state that immigration-related housing
restrictions are necessary to eliminate overcrowding and to combat
substandard housing conditions. However, ordinances that prevent
people from obtaining quality housing are in fact likely to cause people
to live in overcrowded or inadequate housing. 167 While all of the above
belies the notion that AII ordinances have a legitimate purpose,
whether this prong weighs in favor of liability will ultimately depend
on how much deference is accorded to the municipality.
With respect to the fourth Arlington Heights prong, the
plaintiffs challenging All ordinances are not seeking to force the
municipality to provide them with housing. Rather, they simply wish
to prevent the municipality from impeding their ability to obtain
housing for themselves, which clearly weighs in favor of liability.
A simpler test is set forth in Huntington Branch, N.A.A.C.P. v.
Town of Huntington168 and followed by the Second, Third, Fifth, and
Eighth Circuits. This test consists of factors (1) and (3) from the
Arlington Heights test: Is there a disparate impact on a particular
national origin minority? If so, is there a legitimate nondiscriminatory
reason for engaging in the practice? The analysis under Arlington
Heights, therefore, can translate to the Huntington test, and in most
cases would lead to the same result.169

166. For perspective, all nineteen of the terrorists who perpetrated the September 11 attacks
entered the United States legally using various types of visas, and thus would not have been
barred from renting an apartment by any of the All ordinances. See NATIONAL COMMISSION ON
TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, Entry of the 9/11 Hijackers into the United
States, Staff Statement No.
1,
available at
http://www.9-1lcommission.gov/staff
_statements/staffstatementl.pdf.
167. See infra Section III.B.2.
168. 844 F.2d 926, 933-37 (2d Cir. 1988), aff'd on other grounds per curiam, 488 U.S. 15
(1988).
169. See SCHWEMM, supra note 112, § 10:7, at 10-57 (noting that it is unlikely that these two
methods of analysis will produce substantially different results).
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III. PUBLIC POLICY ARGUMENTS MILITATE AGAINST AII HOUSING
MEASURES

The previous Section argued that All housing ordinances are
likely, in their application, to result in discrimination against national
origin minorities and violations of the Fair Housing Act. Even
ignoring the Fair Housing Act, there are several reasons why
immigration-related housing restrictions are unwise. Housing, unlike
other subjects that All ordinances may target, implicates special
matters of public policy. I separate these housing-related public policy
matters into rights-based concerns and practical considerations.
A. Rights-Based Rationales
1. Collateral Damage
One important way in which housing differs from many of the
other subjects targeted by AII ordinances is that when people are
prevented from obtaining housing, the rights and interests of children,
170
families, and communities also suffer.
a. Children and Families
Denying an individual access to housing also affects the people
with whom she lives. A significant number of immigrants live in
"mixed families," in which some members are citizens or have legal
status and some lack legal status. 17 1 While ostensibly targeted only at
unauthorized persons, All housing provisions make it impossible for a
mixed family to live together under one roof and thus penalize the
entire family. Such a result unfairly harms the family members who
are in the United States legally. This is especially so for the millions of
families in which the adult household members are unauthorized but
the minor children are citizens or legally present aliens because
unemancipated minors may not legally reside anywhere without adult

170. It should be emphasized that, while housing is not a "right" in this country, see infra
Section III.A.2, all residents of the United States do have the right not to be discriminated
against because of protected characteristics when obtaining housing. Fair Housing Act of 1968,
42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619, 3631 (2000).
171. Using 2005 data, it has been estimated that there are approximately 3.1 million U.S.born children in families headed by undocumented immigrants (referred to as "unauthorized
families"). PASSEL, supra note 2, at 8. Mixed status families "represent about one-third of all
unauthorized families and five out of six of unauthorized families with children." Id.
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guardianship. 172 Early anecdotal evidence indicates that mixed
173
families are hard hit by AII ordinances.
Even where all members of a family are unauthorized,
punishing the entire family is unfair because it affects children who
are clearly innocent victims. 174 Although often criticized, the Supreme
Court's opinion in Plyler v. Doel75 articulates powerfully the rights and
interests implicated when undocumented children are punished for
their parents' actions. Plyler involved a state law that would have
denied funding to public schools that served children who lacked legal
status. 176 The Court recognized that the law ultimately penalized
children who were not responsible for their unlawful status. 177 Their
parents chose to enter or remain in the country illegally, and the
children were incapable of remedying the situation by independently
moving back to their home countries:
The children who are plaintiffs in these cases "can affect neither their parents' conduct
nor their own status." Even if the State found it expedient to control the conduct of
adults by acting against their children, legislation directing the onus of a parent's
misconduct against his children does not comport with fundamental conceptions of
1 78
justice.

The Plyler Court concluded that it violates Equal Protection to
deny public education to undocumented children 79 despite the fact
that education, like housing, is not a fundamental right guaranteed by
180
the Constitution.
172. E.g. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 654 (1995) ("Traditionally at
common law, and still today, unemancipated minors lack some of the most fundamental aspects
of self-determination-including even the right of liberty in its narrow sense .... ").
173. A real estate agent in a community that passed an All ordinance observed a large
number of Latino families moving out of the area and commented: "This is not something that
only affects the undocumented, because in the same family, it's so common to have some people
who are citizens, some people who are residents, and some who are undocumented. And those
with papers are going to do whatever is necessary to protect those without." N.C. Aizenman, New
FearLeads Both Legal, Illegal Latinos to Leave Pr. William, WASH. POST, Oct. 22, 2007, at Al.
174. It is estimated that in 2005 there were about 1.8 million undocumented children under
the age of eighteen living in the United States (approximately sixteen percent of the total
undocumented population at that time). PASSEL, supra note 2, at 8.
175. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
176. See id. at 205 (describing legal effect of Texas statute at issue).
177. See id. at 220 (finding the statute is "directed against children, and [that it] imposes its
discriminatory burden on the basis of a legal characteristic over which children can have little
control.").
178. Id. at 220 (citation omitted).
179. Id. at 230 ("If the State is to deny a discrete group of innocent children the free public
education that it offers to other children residing within its borders, that denial must be justified
by a showing that it furthers some substantial state interest. No such showing was made here.").
180. Id. at 221 ("Public education is not a 'right' granted to individuals by the Constitution.").
Even the dissenting Justices believed that the Texas law was unwise and unduly punitive. Id. at
242 (Burger, C.J., dissenting):
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Plyler also contains the kernel of an argument supporting the
right of undocumented children to housing. Plyler grants unauthorized
immigrant families legitimately domiciled18 1 within a school district
the right to send their children to public school in that district. The
opinion specifically notes that "illegal entry into the country would
not, under traditional criteria, bar a person from obtaining domicile
within a State." 18 2 Thus, a person's ability to establish residence or
domicile within a particular state-and the rights that flow from such
residence-may be disaggregated from whether her presence in the
country is legal or not.18 3 The argument is a tricky one because the
opinion does not endorse a "right of residence."'1 4 At most, it appears
to simply acknowledge the social fact that undocumented immigrants
have taken up residence in many school districts, and that it is
85
possible for rights to flow from this residency.

Were it our business to set the Nation's social policy, I would agree without
hesitation that it is senseless for an enlightened society to deprive any
children-including illegal aliens-of an elementary education. I fully agree
that it would be folly-and wrong-to tolerate creation of a segment of society
made up of illiterate persons, many having a limited or no command of our
language.
181. See id. at 227 n.22 ("A State may not.., accomplish what would otherwise be
prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause, merely by defining a disfavored group as
nonresident.... Appellants have not shown that the families of undocumented children do not
comply with established standards by which the State historically tests residence."); see also id.
at 240 n.4 (Powell, J., concurring) ("Of course a school district may require that illegal alien
children, like any other children, actually reside in the school district before admitting them to
the schools. A requirement of de facto residency, uniformly applied, would not violate any
principle of equal protection."). One year after Plyler, the Supreme Court grappled with the issue
of determining the legitimacy of domicile in Martinez v. Bynum, 461 U.S. 321 (1983). In
Martinez, a boy who was a U.S. citizen sought to establish a domicile with his adult sister (also a
U.S. citizen) in Texas so that he could attend public school there. Id. at 322-23. The boy's
parents were Mexican citizens who resided in Mexico. Id. The sister was not, and did not intend
to become, her brother's legal guardian. Id. As a result, the Court found that the boy was not
legitimately domiciled in Texas and therefore not entitled to a tuition-free public education. Id.
at 325.
182. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 227 n.22.
183. See id. at 227 (finding the asserted state prerogative of denying undocumented resident
children free education services "solely on the basis of their undocumented status" insufficient to
justify denying them the right to that education).
184. See id. at 226 ("To be sure, like all persons who have entered the United States
unlawfully, these children are subject to deportation.").
185. See id. at 215 (confirming that the Equal Protection Clause secures equally all rights
and obligations imposed by a state on the basis of "presence" within that state). A more recent
example of this is the phenomenon of states that grant in-state tuition to undocumented
residents who attend their public universities. See Ragini Shah, Sharing the American Dream:
Towards Formalizing the Status of Long-Term Resident Undocumented Children in the United
States, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 637, 670-73 (2008) (noting that "ten states.., currently
allow undocumented students access to in-state tuition rates").
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In addition to implicating the rights of children, housing
restrictions infringe on the ability of family members to live together
as a unit. In a long line of cases, the Court has recognized a
substantive due process right to family privacy.186 It is wellestablished that the government cannot take actions that "slic[e]
deeply into the family itself' 18 7 unless it can meet the requirements of
strict scrutiny. For example, despite the traditional deference to
municipalities in zoning matters, the Supreme Court held in Moore v.
City of East Cleveland that municipal zoning restrictions that limit
areas to single-family occupancy and define "family" in a way that
prevents certain family members from living together are
unconstitutional because they violate the right to privately order
family as one chooses.1 8 All provisions that prevent a family from
residing together because one member of the family lacks legal status
raise similar constitutional concerns.
Local governments may respond that All provisions meet strict
scrutiny because the community's need to rid itself of unauthorized
persons is a compelling state interest.18 9 A court may well find,
186. See, e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (parallel citations
omitted); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974) ("The Court has long
recognized that freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life is one of the
liberties protected by the Due Process Clause .. ");Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 231-33
(1972) (holding that the interest of parents in the religious upbringing of their children trumps
state interest in requiring children to attend school); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972)
(holding that a state cannot presumptively presume unwed fathers to be unfit parents
consistently with their interests under the Due Process Clause); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S.
629, 639 (1968) ("[C]onstitutional interpretation has consistently recognized that the parents'
claim to authority in their own household to direct the rearing of their children is basic in the
structure of our society."); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965); Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (holding the marital relationship to be within a "zone of
privacy created by several constitutional guarantees").
187. Moore, 431 U.S. at 498.
188. In Moore, a city's single-family zoning ordinance defined family in such a way as to
prevent a grandmother from living with her son and two grandsons, because the boys were
cousins as opposed to brothers. Id. at 496-97. The Court (with Justice Powell writing for a
plurality and Justice Stevens concurring) struck down the ordinance. Id. at 506. The plurality
determined that because the ordinance intruded on the Fourteenth Amendment rights of privacy
and familial association, strict scrutiny, rather than rational basis review, was appropriate.
Specifically, the plurality reasoned:
When a city undertakes such intrusive regulation of the family ....the usual
deference to the legislature is inappropriate. This Court has long recognized
that freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life is one
of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Id. at 499 (internal citations omitted). The city's stated purposes for the ordinance-reducing
traffic, parking congestion, and the burden on the schools-failed, in light of the fact that the
ordinance as written was not narrowly-tailored to address these problems. Id. at 500 & n.7.
189. See supraSection II.A.
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however, that the All provisions fail the strict scrutiny test because
they are not narrowly tailored; they are both overinclusive (by
burdening innocent family members) and underinclusive (by
restricting unauthorized people only from residing in rental units, but
not from owning property or residing with others who do). 90
b. The Community
Housing practices that prevent a particular group from
obtaining housing in a particular area also implicate the interests of
the broader community. 191 Widespread discriminatory practices skew
the racial balance of the entire community and can lead to racial and
ethnic segregation. 192 Physical isolation breeds a lack of
understanding at best and animosity, inequality, and violence at
worst. 193 Segregation is reinforced by its negative consequences: a
distorted residential real estate market, reduced property values, a
diminished tax base, and segregated schools.1 94 Ultimately, these
harms are borne by the community as a whole, not simply the
95
excluded groups.

190. Id.
191. The argument could be made, of course, that illegal immigrants are by definition legally
prohibited from residing in the United States and therefore have no right to obtain housing in
any particular area. Id. This is true; however, as discussed previously, illegal immigrants are not
the only people affected by All housing restrictions. See supra Section III.A.l.b.
192. See, e.g., Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 110-11 (1979) (noting
that discriminatory practices may alter the racial composition of neighborhood causing multiple
"harms flowing from the realities of a racially segregated community").
193. The President's National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, commonly referred
to as "the Kerner Commission," was tasked to report on the conditions leading up to the mass
riots in American cities in the summer of 1967. Exec. Order No. 11,365, 32 Fed. Reg. 11,111 (July
29, 1967). The Commission found that a major cause of the unrest was widespread racial
segregation in housing. REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 1,
5, 118-20 (1968). This segregation, which amounted to a "system of apartheid," was in large part
the result of housing discrimination that kept blacks confined to urban centers while allowing
whites to spread out into the suburbs. Id. at 118-20, 215-25. The Commission warned that
America was rapidly becoming "two societies, one black, one white-separate and unequal," and it
concluded that this trend was the single biggest social challenge facing America in the modern
era. Id. at 1; see also DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID 8 (1993)
(asserting that residential segregation "is the institutional apparatus that supports other
racially discriminatory processes and binds them together into a coherent and uniquely effective
system of racial subordination").
194. See, e.g., Gladstone, 441 U.S. at 110-11 (finding that de facto segregation would likely
create numerous collateral harms in the property market and that "school segregation is linked
closely to housing segregation").
195. See id. at 111-15 (holding the deprivation of the benefits of racially-integrated housing
to be sufficient to constitute a "distinct and palpable injury" to parties suing on behalf of entire
community to create standing to sue the parties allegedly responsible).
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Segregationist practices
are
especially insidious
and
intractable when they are exclusionary. This is particularly true for
such policies adopted into state or local policy. The reason is simple:
people kept from living within a municipality or county will have a
hard time playing a meaningful role in that locality's political
process. 196 Residency within a geographic boundary has long been
viewed as a key element of the franchise. 197 The requirement that one
be an "insider" to have a say in local policy means that those who are
forced or kept out will have a limited ability to change the status
quo.19 8 Meanwhile, those who are "in" will continue to shape the
community in ways that suit their own preferences. 199 The segregation
and exclusion thus becomes self-perpetuating and increasingly
difficult to remedy. 200 Currently, non-naturalized immigrants who are
unable to vote (as they are in all but a few jurisdictions) 20 1 can still
influence the polity through decisions about where to spend money,
the types of businesses they operate, and which public services to
use. 20 2 In addition, nonvoting residents can support particular
196. But see Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 508 n.18 (1975) (arguing somewhat facetiously
that if people are dissatisfied with exclusionary zoning laws they should not "overlook the
availability of the normal democratic process").
197. See Richard Briffault, The Local Government Boundary Problem in Metropolitan Areas,
48 STAN. L. REV. 1115, 1126, 1128 (1996) ("Local governments, in short, are place-based polities
organized on the principle of residency ....
Only rarely the subject of litigation, the connection
between boundaries and the structure of local governments is virtually axiomatic: Boundaries
typically determine such crucial issues as the electorate for local elections .... ); Richard Ford,
The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in Legal Analysis, 107 HARv. L. REV. 1841, 1866-67
(1994) (noting that residency has long been a definitive element of local polities and that the
Supreme Court has required the franchise to be extended to all "bona fide residents").
198. See Ford, supra note 197, at 1874 (noting that exclusionary policies, by definition,
"exclude 'outsiders' from the political processes of the locality"). This results in what Ford refers
to as the "tautology of community self-definition." Id. at 1861-64.
199. See Briffault, supra note 197, at 1142 (arguing that by drawing boundaries and limiting
local government franchise to those within the boundaries, municipal governments are able to
tailor policy more closely to the peculiar political desires of those insiders, and attract primarily
potential settlers with similar desires, and further noting that one early reason for local
government incorporation was racial exclusion).
200. Ford, supra note 197, at 1871 ("The 'democratic process' that produces and legitimates
exclusionary zoning is thus very questionable: in many cases, the only significant vote that will
be taken on the exclusionary ordinance is the first vote.").
201. See Richard Briffault, The Contested Right to Vote, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1506, 1526 (2002)
("[A] handful of school districts permit aliens whose children are in school to vote in community
school board elections, and at least one locality permits aliens to vote in municipal elections.
With these exceptions, however, resident aliens are unenfranchised, even at the state and local
level." (citation omitted)).
202. See, e.g., Randal C. Archibold, Immigrants Take to U.S. Streets in Show of Strength,
N.Y. TIMES, May, 2, 2006, at Al (describing hundreds of thousands of immigrants in multiple
cities participating in rallies as part of a national campaign during which non-naturalized
immigrants would not participate in any economic activities).
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institutions that have political power, such as churches, civic
20 3
organizations, and advocacy groups.
Standing doctrine under the Fair Housing Act has long
recognized that housing discrimination and the resulting segregated
living patterns affect the entire community. 20 4 The FHA authorizes
20 5
any person aggrieved by housing discrimination to file a complaint.
It defines "aggrieved person" broadly as "anyone who claims to have
been injured by a discriminatory housing practice" under the
statute, 20 6 which means that a person can raise an FHA claim even if
he or she was not the target of discrimination. 20 7 For example, in
Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., a white resident of an
apartment complex sued the complex because its racially
discriminatory policies effectively ensured that virtually all residents
of the complex were white. 208 A unanimous Supreme Court held that
the plaintiffs injury, which consisted of "the loss of important benefits
from interracial associations,"' 20 9 was sufficient to grant standing
under the FHA. The Court reasoned that "[t]he person on the
landlord's blacklist is not the only victim of discriminatory housing
practices; it is, . . . 'the whole community[.]' "210 A number of other
Supreme Court cases have endorsed this view of community harm and
"community standing" under the FHA. 211 This line of case law is
203. See Kevin R. Johnson, Los Olvidados: Images of the Immigrant, Political Power of
Noncitizens, and Immigration Law and Enforcement, 1993 BYU L. REV. 1139, 1155-56 (noting
the political power noncitizens can wield through various organizations).
204. See, e.g., Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209 (1972) (finding standing
under the Fair Housing Act because "the whole community" is a victim of discriminatory housing
practices (quoting 114 CONG. REc. 2706 (1968) (statement of Sen. Javits))).
205. Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3601(a)(1)(A)(i) (2000).
206. Id. § 3602(i)(1).
207. Thus, the standing requirements under the FHA are merely those required by Article
III of the Constitution-that the plaintiff has suffered "a minima of injury in fact." Havens Realty
Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 372 (1982). The prudential limitations on standing-the
prohibition on a plaintiff raising another person's legal rights, the rule barring adjudication of
generalized grievances, and the requirement that the plaintiffs complaint fall within the zone of
interests protected by the law involved-are not applicable in cases brought under the FHA. See
id. ("[C]ourts... lack the authority to create prudential barriers to standing in suits brought
under [the Fair Housing Act]."). These limitations, in addition to deficiencies in Article III
standing, were found to prevent community members from challenging an exclusionary zoning
ordinance in Warth v. Seldin, a case brought pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment and
Reconstruction-era civil rights statutes but would not have prevented claims under the FHA. 422
U.S. 490, 513-14 (1975).
208. 409 U.S. at 207-08.
209. Id. at 210-12.
210. Id. at 211 (quoting 114 CONG. REC. 2706 (1968) (statement of Sen. Javits)).
211. In Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood the Court allowed a municipality and four
of its residents to bring a FHA claim against a realty company, in which they alleged that the
company's practice of steering whites and blacks into different neighborhoods was destroying the
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growing dated, however, and has been undercut (although not
overruled) by the Rehnquist Court's standing rulings in cases like
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife.212 It is also quite likely that the current
Supreme Court would look unfavorably on the FHA's liberal standing
doctrine. I do not wish to weigh in on the continued soundness of the
FHA's standing doctrine. Rather, I cite this line of cases merely to
underscore that housing discrimination and segregationist practices
cause harm to a broader swath of individuals beyond the immediate
victims, and that such harm has been judicially recognized.
Early anecdotal evidence indicates that, in fact, significant
numbers of Latino residents are leaving areas that have passed All
ordinances. 213 In some instances, this rapid loss of a significant part of
the community has burdened the larger community with economic and
social upheavals. 2 14 For example, the newly-revitalized business
district in Riverside, New Jersey, became vacant again after the
town's All ordinance was enacted, and many initial supporters of the
ordinance came to question whether it had actually benefitted the
215
town.
2. The Significance of Housing
The point is simple but important: housing is central to basic
human existence. The consequences of the other All provisions-the
inability to work, the inability to do business in one's native language,

racially integrated character of a twelve- by thirteen-block residential neighborhood. 441 U.S. 91,
93-95, 115 (1979). The plaintiffs' injuries consisted of "the loss of social and professional
benefits" that accrue from living in an integrated community, as well as the economic injury
caused by declining property values. Id. at 115. The Court rejected the defendant's argument
that a residential neighborhood could not constitute the same type of "community" as the
apartment complex at issue in Trafficante. Id. at 113-14; see also Havens Realty Corp. v.
Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 377-78 (1982) (recognizing the ability of community members to
challenge housing discrimination under the FHA, but requiring the relevant "community" to be
narrowly defined to include only those areas affected by the discriminatory conduct).
212. 504 U.S. 555, 560 & n.1 (1992) (requiring, as an "irreducible constitutional minimum of
standing," a "particularized" and "actual or imminent" injury to a legally protected interest
specifically occurring to the plaintiff "in a personal or individual way").
213. See, e.g., Ken Belson & Jill P. Capuzzo, Towns Rethink Laws Against Illegal
Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2007, at Al (reporting that, within months following a New
Jersey township's passage of All ordinances, "hundreds, if not thousands, of immigrants from
Brazil and Latin American countries had fled").
214. See, e.g., id. (describing the significant negative social, economic, and legal impacts on
communities following the passage of All ordinances).
215. Id.
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or the deprivation of public services-are serious, but losing stable
housing is potentially devastating to all other aspects of life. 216
One commentator observes:
Of all the elements that comprise cities, suburbs, and towns, housing is perhaps the
most complex. In addition to providing shelter, housing is also the driver of
transportation patterns, a consumption good, a prominent feature of the built
environment, an investment for building wealth, a determinant of social interaction and
217
achievement, and a symbol of familial connections and personal history.

Another illustrates "the centrality of housing" by pointing out
that housing "functions as the focal point where [multiple] critical
economic and social forces and practices intersect. ' 218 A third argues:
Housing is never merely shelter. However inadequate and temporary, one's shelter
becomes the ground floor for meeting basic needs, a foundation for job search and
education, and a piece of one's identity - a "home" of sorts. For those who have always
been adequately housed and take it for granted, a full appreciation for the importance of
adequate, decent[,] and affordable housing can probably only be gained by experiencing
its loss.

2 19

Residence also has important ramifications for self-definition.
Richard Briffault argues that "[1]ocalities are valued not as temporary
nodes in a continual migratory process, but as 'life spaces,' rich with
personal and cultural meaning.... Local citizenship can be seen, not
simply as a matter of residence, but as 'primarily a relation of
membership' in an on-going entity. '2 20 For all of these reasons, the
concept of the home has long occupied an important position in the
22 1
American consciousness and legal system.
216. See Iglesias, supra note 62, at 442 (describing the significant ramifications of being
deprived of adequate housing in myriad areas).
217. Id. at 440.
218. Justin D. Cummins, Recasting Fair Share: Toward Effective Housing Law and
Principled Social Policy, 14 LAw & INEQ. 339, 342-51 (1996) (noting that housing is closely
linked to employment and educational opportunities, access to health care and financial capital,
and access to mentoring and information networks).
219. Iglesias, supra note 62, at 442; see also Manuel Mariano Lopez, Su Casa No Es Mi Casa:
Hispanic Housing Conditions in Contemporary America, 1949-1980, in RACE, ETHNICITY, AND
MINORITY HOUSING IN THE UNITED STATES 127, 127 (Jamshid A. Momeni ed., 1986) (arguing

that "housing provides a setting for one's entire social existence," and that being "ill-housed" can
cause deprivations in health, safety, and transportation, which can then lead to disadvantages in
employment, education opportunities and economic stability).
220. Richard Briffault, The Local Government Boundary Problem in Metropolitan Areas, 48
STAN. L. REV. 1115, 1127-28 (1996).
221. A long line of cases recognizes the significance of the home in American law and society.
See, e.g., Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484 (1988) (finding the protection of residential privacy
to be a significant government interest); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 471 (1980) (noting that
"[t]he State's interest in protecting the well-being, tranquility, and privacy of the home is
certainly of the highest order in a free and civilized society," and "[p]reserving the sanctity of the
home, the one retreat to which men and women can repair to escape from the tribulations of
their daily pursuits, is surely an important value"); Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 125 (1969)
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But the concept of the home as a legal entity has its limits.
Although human rights paradigms recognize the importance of
housing, and some human rights treaties and other resolutions treat
housing as a basic right, 222 these agreements are either nonbinding or
the United States has refused to sign them. Social justice activists in
the 1970s also failed to establish a positive right to housing in the
federal Constitution, 223 and American courts have consistently refused
224
to recognize a positive right to shelter.
Nevertheless, American policy still recognizes the value of
shelter even if there is no positive right to a home. The Housing Act of
1949 established as a national "goal" that every American family have
"a decent home and a suitable living environment." 225 Thus, federal,
state, and local governments may attempt to supply housing to those
(Black, J., concurring) (describing the unique nature of the home as "the last citadel of the tired,
the weary, and the sick"). There are also a number of cases in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
that emphasize the importance of the home, far too many to be cited to here. See, e.g., Payton v.
New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980) (noting that under Fourth Amendment law, searches and
seizures inside a home with no warrant are presumptively unreasonable).
222. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 25 ("Everyone has the right to a
standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including
food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services."); International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 11 (containing similar language).
223. Burt Neuborne, State Constitutions and the Evolution of Positive Rights, 20 RUTGERS
L.J. 881, 886-87 (1989) (describing failed litigation efforts at the national level). Commentators
continue to advance arguments for making housing a positive right, often by looking either to
state constitutions or to international human rights norms. See generally, e.g., Curtis Berger,
Beyond Homelessness: An Entitlement to Housing, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 315, 317 (1990-91)
(suggesting a coalition between the government and the private sector to create a national
entitlement to housing); Robert Doughten, Filling Everyone's Bowl: A Call To Affirm a Positive
Right to Minimum Welfare Guaranteesand Shelter in State Constitutions to Satisfy International
Standardsof Human Decency, 39 GONZ. L. REV. 421, 423 (2003-04) (contending that such rights
should be found by looking to international human rights norms); Florence Wagman Roisman,
Establishinga Right to Housing: A General Guide, 25 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 203, 203-04 (1991)
(discussing programs in several states aimed at providing homes to the homeless); Rob Rosenthal
& Maria Foscarinis, Responses to Homelessness: Past Policies, Future Directions, and a Right to
Housing, in A RIGHT TO HOUSING: FOUNDATION FOR A NEW SOCIAL AGENDA 316, 317-19 (Rachel
G. Bratt et al. eds., 2006) (discussing local efforts to address the problem); Bradley R. Haywood,
Note, The Right to Shelter as a FundamentalInterest Under the New York State Constitution, 34
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 157, 157 (2002) (arguing that a right to shelter can be found in New
York's State Constitution). Of course, the notion of a positive right to shelter has critics as well.
See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, The Untenable Case for an Unconditional Right to Shelter, 15
HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 17, 17, 24-25 (1992) (arguing that housing conditions in countries that
recognize a right to shelter are poor, and that the guarantee of such a right will undermine the
incentives of the poor to work).
224. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972) (although recognizing "the importance of
decent, safe, and sanitary housing," holding that the Constitution does not guarantee access to
any particular type of housing); Williams v. Barry, 708 F.2d 789, 793 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Bork, J.,
concurring) ("No one has plausibly maintained that there is a constitutional ... right to cityprovided shelter.").
225. 42 U.S.C. § 1441 (2000).
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in need as a policy matter but at the same time refuse to recognize any
legal right to housing.
However, the individuals directly or collaterally deprived of
housing by AII ordinances-legal
immigrants, unauthorized
immigrants, and U.S. citizens of manifest ethnicity regardless of
immigration status-are not asking any unit of government to provide
them with housing. Nor are they asking private individuals to supply
them with housing free of charge. 226 They are simply attempting to
procure housing for themselves, at their own expense, on the private
market. An analogy between food and housing, both basic necessities,
might be instructive here: Even though many people in America may
believe that unauthorized immigrants should not be eligible for food
stamps, how many would argue that they should be prohibited from
buying food? There is something particularly inhumane about a legal
regime that prevents people from obtaining shelter, even those who
are illegally present in the country.
3. Harassment and Hostility
Increased hostility against, and harassment of, national origin
minority group members will likely result from All ordinances
generally and All housing measures in particular.
All ordinances generally create deep and ugly rifts in the
communities that debate enacting them. City council meetings turn
violent, groups on each side of the issue hold massive demonstrations,
and threats are made against city officials and activists. 227 Moreover,

226. This was essentially the situation in Lindsey, 405 U.S. 56, in which the plaintiffs were
tenants who sought to challenge Oregon's landlord-tenant law, which prevented them from
withholding rent in response to the landlord's failure to provide basic maintenance. Addressing
the plaintiffs' argument that this statute deprived them of their fundamental right to decent
shelter, the Court specifically held that the Constitution does not recognize "the right of a tenant
to occupy the real property of his landlord beyond the term of his lease without the payment of
rent or otherwise contrary to the terms of the relevant agreement." Id. at 74. To find otherwise,
the Court reasoned, would likely violate the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Id. Thus,
the Supreme Court's main judicial pronouncement foreclosing any Constitutional right to
housing is itself limited to the proposition that there is no such right to free housing.
227. In San Bernardino competing groups faced off in an angry confrontation at the
courthouse while a judge heard the issue of whether to allow the AII measure to be placed on the
ballot. Kelly Rayburn, "Illegal Immigration Relief Act" Not Likely to Appear on Ballot, INLAND
VALLEY
DAiLY
BULL.
(Ontario,
Cal.),
Jun.
27,
2006,
available
at
http://www.dailybulletin.com/news/ci-3983764. After the initiative's chief proponent told one
Latino activist 'Your mother can go [bleep] herself," the activist slapped him in the face and was
arrested for battery. Id.; see also Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 508-10 (M.D.
Pa. 2007) (describing atmosphere of fear and hostility that surrounded Hazleton's AII ordinance,
including threatening letters sent to one ordinance opponent); Barry, supra note 107 (describing
how police were required to keep groups of white and Latino demonstrators apart as the
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in the areas where All ordinances have passed, Latinos report being
constantly and indiscriminately harassed. 228 It is impossible to
determine how much of this harassment is traceable to any particular
All provision or how much stems from the acrimony of the public
discourse and the inflammatory rhetoric of those who support these
measures. However, if we could draw such distinctions, it seems likely
that a good deal of the harassment would stem from the housing
provisions. This is because the goal of All housing measures is not to
prevent people from engaging in a particular activity (such as
working, conducting business in Spanish, or congregating in a
particular place), but to remove a specific group of people from the
community. When this is combined with the difficulty of determining
immigration status; the public's confusion over legal status, alienage,
and national origin; and the perception that people of manifest
ethnicity are "aliens"-not to mention the irresponsible statements of
political leaders 229-the result is a cloud of suspicion over all national
origin minorities. Thus, jurisdictions with All housing measures tend
to be centers of mass community sentiment against the very presence
of Latinos and other groups, regardless of their actual legal status. In
short, they are harassed simply for being within the city limits and
looking like they are not from the United States.
Hazleton City Council voted on its All ordinance, and noting that Hazleton Mayor Lou Barletta
wore a bullet-proof vest to the vote); Toni Callas, Riverside Council Approves Anti-Illegal
Immigration Crack-Down, PHILA. INQUIRER, July 27, 2006, at Bi (describing Riverside City
Council meeting where All ordinance was approved, which was marked by "jeers, screams, and
shouting matches" and from which police escorted several people); Dianne Solis, Moving on in
Farmers Branch, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, May, 14, 2007, at 1A (describing how the Mayor of
Farmers Branch had his home vandalized after coming out against the All ordinance, and how
the Department of Justice had to send election monitors when the ballot initiative was voted on).
One could argue that such feelings were preexisting and would only be exacerbated by a
regime that divests all decisions from the locality. See Rodriguez, supra note 3, at 639
("[P]reempting local laws that aim to exclude immigrants will not make for a better integration
environment, because the sentiments behind the preempted ordinances are likely to remain and
fester."). Nevertheless, in many of the cases to receive press coverage, the introduction of the
ordinance seems to be the catalyst for the rancor. See, e.g., Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 510 n.31
(M.D. Pa. 2007) (noting that the All ordinance "apparently had the effect of increasing racial
tension in the City"); Kotlowitz, supra note 102 (noting that the All ordinance in one jurisdiction
"has turned neighbor against neighbor").
228. See, e.g., Campbell, supra note 6, at 1044 ("The targeting of 'illegal aliens' that brought
suspicion on anyone who might be suspected of not being lawfully present because of their skin
color made non-white residents of Hazleton-citizen and noncitizen alike-fearful of being subject
to harassment and singled out as a nuisance, a public burden, or worse-a criminal."). According
to one Latino business owner in Riverside, N.J., "The ordinance almost authorizes a vigilantetype attitude. Everyone lives in fear." Press Release, ACLU, Businesses Sue Riverside Over
available at
2006),
(Oct. 18,
Ordinance
Discriminatory Anti-Immigrant
Vague,
http://www.aclu.org/immigrants/discrim/27107prs20061018.html.
229. See supra notes 104-106.
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The experience of California in the wake of Proposition 187,230
a 1994 state ballot initiative that barred undocumented immigrants
from receiving most public benefits and public education, is
instructive. Commentators noted that numerous acts of harassment
and discrimination followed after the ballot initiative passed and that
the majority of victims were U.S. citizens or legal immigrants, not the
231
undocumented individuals who were the initiative's targets.
Researchers observed a 23.5% increase in hate crimes against Latinos
in Los Angeles that year, and advocates described thousands of calls
to a hotline for reporting complaints about ethnic-based harassment
232
and discrimination.
B. PracticalConsiderations
In addition to the rights-based arguments against All housing
measures, there are a number of practical reasons why All housing
provisions should not be pursued as a matter of public policy. These
considerations include the nature of housing and the landlord-tenant
relationship, the lack of connection between housing and illegal
immigration, the manner in which most All ordinances would have to
be enforced, and the contrary goals and consequences of such
enforcement.
1. Nature of Rental Housing and the Rental Transaction
Several characteristics of private rental housing and the rental
transaction demonstrate the perversity of attempting to introduce
immigration restrictions into the equation. First, renting an
apartment is an arm's length consumer transaction. It takes place on
the private market, with little oversight from state or federal
authorities. 233 The typical apartment rental involves some initial
contact between the landlord and the tenant as the parties arrange for
the rental, but little direct interaction after that. No agency
23 4
relationship is formed, as with an employer-employee relationship.
230. See supra note 7.
231. Barth, supranote 95, at 113-14.
232. Nancy Cervantes, Sasha Khokha & Bobbie Murray, Hate Unleashed: Los Angeles in the
Aftermath of Proposition187, 17 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 1, 8-9 (Fall 1995).
233. It is true that every state has a landlord-tenant law that governs many of the rights and
obligations of the parties to a lease, and state and federal civil rights laws apply to prevent
discrimination. Nevertheless, these are complaint-driven legal mechanisms-they will not be
triggered unless and until someone invokes them.
234. At most, renting an apartment creates an ongoing relationship based on the different
interests the landlord and the tenant have in the same piece of property.
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The landlord and the tenant are simply two private individuals who
have entered into a contract the performance of which usually involves
little more than sending a monthly rent payment. Bringing
immigration law enforcement into this transaction makes little
intuitive sense, and the slippery slope argument is strong: If we allow
immigration restrictions for rental housing, what comes next?
Requiring people to show their birth certificates or immigration
papers before they buy a car? A pair of shoes? A gallon of milk?
Moreover, private rental housing has no logical intersection
with other government programs in which verification of immigration
status is justified. In employment, for example, requiring employers to
check the immigration status of their employees makes sense because
employers must report salary payments and withholdings to the
Internal Revenue Service, state taxation authorities, and the Social
Security Administration. Immigration status is relevant to how people
are taxed and whether they are able to participate in the social
security system. Put another way, by working and paying taxes, a
person becomes connected into various state and federal bureaucracies
in ways that implicate immigration status. The same does not hold
true for renting an apartment.
2. Relationship Between Housing and the Stated Goals of
All Ordinances
One of the chief goals of All provisions generally is the
preservation of scarce resources for American citizens and those
legally present in the United States. Jobs are one such resource. The
belief that unauthorized immigrants are "taking" jobs from American
citizens is one of the most powerful forces driving the anti-illegal
immigrant movement. Hence, Congress passed IRCA, which singled
out employment as an area of particular concern. 235 Virtually every
state and local AII ordinance features employment restrictions as its
centerpiece. Public benefits are another scarce resource; thus,
virtually all federal benefits are limited to American citizens and legal
immigrants. By contrast, in the vast majority of markets nationwide,
private rental housing is not a scarce commodity. 236 There is no
serious argument that undocumented people are depriving others of
apartments. Similarly, an argument against the employment of
unauthorized immigrants is that it skews the labor market by driving
235. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (2000).
236. In this regard, market-rate private rental housing can be contrasted with subsidized or
affordable housing, which is extremely scarce in most places and which is not the focus of this
Article.
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wages down. No argument can plausibly be made, however, that the
presence of unauthorized immigrants skews the market for housing by
driving the cost of housing up.
A related goal of All legislation is to eliminate "pull factors"
that draw unauthorized immigrants into this country and to
particular areas. Employment is the single most powerful pull factor
for illegal immigration to this country. 237 Similarly, public benefits
such as health care, education, and welfare, are regarded as pull
factors (although whether these benefits actually "pull" has never
been demonstrated). 2 3 Housing, in contrast, is simply not a pull factor
that brings unauthorized people to the United States. 239 No one has
argued that the housing provisions of All ordinances are necessary to
stop people from coming to the United States in search of private
rental units.
While housing does not draw unauthorized people to any
particular area, it is true that the ability to obtain some type of
housing is usually a necessary condition for them to remain there for
any length of time. Rental restrictions therefore do serve anotherusually unstated-goal of All measures, which is to make life so
unpleasant for unauthorized people that they will leave voluntarily. 240
This goal contains some inherent problems.
First, if the All housing provisions fail to drive unauthorized
people out of town and instead drive them further underground, the
results will run directly counter to the stated reasons for the housing
provisions: the elimination of overcrowding and poor housing
conditions. Virtually every ordinance that contains housing-specific

237. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 228 (1982) ("The dominant incentive for illegal entry into
the State of Texas is the availability of employment ....); Pham, supra note 3, at 810 ("Experts
agree that employment is the most important factor drawing undocumented immigrants to the
United States ....").
238. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 228 ("[Flew if any illegal immigrants come to this country... in
order to avail themselves of a free education."); Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration,Federalism,
and the Welfare State, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1453, 1465 (1995) (finding "no empirical evidence that
significant numbers of people immigrate to the United States for public education or for welfare,
although admittedly it does not follow that the sudden termination of either health services or
public education would not spur some immigrants to leave or discourage others from coming").
Indeed, the fact that unauthorized people are prevented from receiving most welfare and health
care benefits belies the contention that these are pull factors.
239. Pham, supra note 3, at 791 ("No one argues that the availability of housing is a pull
factor, drawing undocumented immigrants to the United States.").
240. Hazleton Mayor Louis Barletta made clear that the purpose of that city's ordinance was
to "get rid of the illegal people," emphasizing, "It's this simple: They must leave." Michael Powell
& Michele Garcia, Pa. City Puts Illegal Immigrantson Notice, WASH.POST, Aug. 22, 2006, at A03
(emphasis in original).
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justifications points to these goals. The ordinance of Cherokee County,
Georgia, contains representative language:
4. Because [unauthorized immigrants] are not in this country lawfully, there is an
increased chance that they will reside in dwelling units without typical leasing,
payment and other tenancy arrangements that enable the civil and regulatory processes
of the County to be effective. The regulations of the County regarding housing and
property maintenance often depend upon reporting by residents and neighbors as a
means of bringing unlawful conditions, and notify authorities [sic], or to participate in
subsequent proceedings to remedy such conditions. This creates an increased likelihood
that housing and property maintenance violations will remain unreported and because
such conditions are unreported, an increased chance that such conditions will multiply
in the future.
5. Because of the lack of tenancy arrangements that are subject to normal civil and
regulatory processes ... there is a greater chance that such individuals will occupy
residential units in excessively large numbers, or under living conditions, that do not
meet applicable building and health and safety codes. This creates unanticipated
241
burdens on the unit and the public infrastructure supporting such dwellings.

All rental restrictions, however, will likely lead to
overcrowding, because people who cannot rent housing on their own
will "double-" or "triple-up" with families who own their homes or who
live in rental housing with lax landlord oversight. Unauthorized
immigrants may be forced into substandard living conditions, as
unscrupulous landlords who are willing to violate the law take
advantage of them and charge high rents for poor-quality housing. It
is hard to imagine a plan more likely to increase these ills than one
that prevents people from freely renting decent housing of their own.
A second problem with using rental restrictions as a
mechanism for driving unauthorized immigrants out of town is that
these restrictions are both under- and over-inclusive. They are underinclusive because they do not reach all unauthorized immigrants, just
those residing in or seeking to reside in rental housing. Unauthorized
people, so long as they reside in the United States, are still able to
legally purchase homes in virtually every jurisdiction. 242 They may
4-5 (2006); see also Escondido, Cal.,
241. Cherokee County, Ga., Ordinance 2006-03 § 1,
3 (2006) (containing identical language); Riverside, N.J., Ordinance
Ordinance 2006-38 § 1,
2006-16 § 166-2(I)-(J) (2006) (amended by Ordinances 2006-19, 2006-26) (describing how
unscrupulous landlords who rent to unauthorized people typically charge them excessive rent,
which leads to overcrowding conditions, which then cause fire, health, and public safety
hazards).
242. Nothing in federal law prevents unauthorized immigrants from owning homes.
Unauthorized immigrants are often able to apply for credit and open bank accounts using the
Individual Taxpayer Identification Number ("ITIN") issued by the IRS, which allows
undocumented people to pay taxes in lieu of a Social Security Number. It is not uncommon for
banks (including large lenders such as Citibank and Bank of America) to use ITINs in making
mortgage loans to undocumented people. See Kenneth R. Harney, Should Taxpayer ID Be
Enough for a Loan?, SAN JOSE MERcURY-NEWS, Feb. 24, 2007, at RE8 (discussing a proposed bill
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also reside with friends or relatives who own their homes, or they may
become homeless but still remain in the area to work. All rental
restrictions are over-inclusive because, as discussed supra, they may
force out U.S. citizens and legal residents who reside in mixed
243
families.
3. Regulatory and Bureaucratic Mechanisms
The regulatory and bureaucratic mechanisms required to
implement any All housing ordinance would be onerous, intrusive,
and prohibitively expensive. Regardless of who enforces AII housing
measures-federal officials, local officials, or private landlords-the
ability to do so depends on the existence of a quick, cheap, and reliable
means to verify the legal status of every tenant and applicant for
housing. Indeed, virtually all of the Hazleton-style ordinances require
verification with the "federal government" as a central feature of their
enforcement and/or registration schemes. Such a requirement would
require a comprehensive database containing accurate and up-to-date

that would prohibit home loans to anyone without a social security number); Miriam Jordan,
Loans to Illegals Seen as Sturdy, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Oct. 14, 2007, at S8 (noting that, even with the
credit crunch, this type of loan is still made frequently and has a lower default rate than other
types of loans); Juan Antonio Lizama, Documents Can Help Illegal Immigrants Get Accounts,
RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Sept. 16, 2007, at A14 (noting that some banks will give loans
without verifying an immigrant's status, so long as he has a reliable source of identification);
Rick Rothacker, Mortgages for Illegal Immigrants: Goal of Attracting Hispanic Market Also
Creates Window for Segment, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, July 29, 2007, at ID (arguing that banks
are making this type of loan in an effort to attract the Hispanic market); see also Calvin Bellamy,
Serving the Under-Served: Banking for Undocumented Immigrants, AM. IMMIGR. LAW FOUND.,
Mar. 30, 2007, available at http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/index.php?content=P20070416
(discussing the potential benefits of this type of loan to an under-served group).
A number of states have so-called "alien land laws," which restrict noncitizens from owning
property in a variety of ways. Early versions of these laws focused in a direct and discriminatory
way on race and national origin. For example, California passed a law that essentially prohibited
only noncitizens of Japanese origin from owning property. Such obviously discriminatory laws
have since been repealed. Today, the vast majority of such laws are not targeted at aliens per se,
but at non-resident aliens and/or corporations, or at alien ownership of resources such as
agricultural fields or industrial. sites. For a discussion of alien land laws, their history, and their
current iterations, see generally Ronald L. Bell & Jonathan D. Savage, Note, Our Land is Your
Land: Ineffective State Restriction of Alien Land Ownership, 13 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 679 (1980);
William B. Fisch, State Regulation of Alien Land Ownership, 43 MO. L. REV. 407 (1978); James
A. Fretcher, Note, Alien Landownership in the United States: A Matter of State Control, 14
BROOK. J. INT'L L 147 (1988); James R. Mason, Jr., Note, 'Pssst, Hey Buddy, Wanna Buy a
Country?" An Economic and Political Policy Analysis of Federal and State Laws Governing
Foreign Ownership of United States Real Estate, 27 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 453 (1994); Fred L.
Morrison, Limitations on Alien Investment in American Real Estate, 60 MINN. L. REV. 621 (1976).
243. See supra Section III.A.1.a.
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information about every lawful immigrant and non-immigrant visitor
to the United States at a given time. 244 No such database exists. 245
The federal government maintains a variety of immigrationrelated databases for specific purposes. For example, the U.S.
Customs and Immigration Service ("USCIS") operates a database to
check immigration status for work authorization called E-Verify
(formerly known as Basic Pilot).246 E-Verify compares a job applicant's
name, date of birth, and social security number against centralized
databases run by the Social Security Administration and USCIS to
verify identity and citizenship status. 247 The information is then run
through a database operated by the Department of Homeland Security
to determine employment eligibility. 2 48 E-Verify is part of a larger
program used to check immigration status for receipt of welfare
benefits called Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements
("SAVE"). 249 There are a variety of reasons why these systems should
not be used to verify legal status for prospective tenants.
244. This is in contrast with employment and receipt of public benefits, for which only
limited categories of lawful immigrants and non-immigrant visitors are eligible. As discussed
below, there are specialized databases for making such eligibility determinations, although these
have serious flaws. See infra notes 245-52.
245. After Farmers Branch approved the latest version of its All ordinance, a spokesperson
for the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services was quoted as saying: "There is no database
where the city or anyone can pick up the phone and give alienage, like yes this person is legal or
no that person isn't legal; there is no such database." Annabelle Garay, Suburb Passes New AntiImmigrant Rule, USA TODAY, Jan. 22, 2008 (quoting Maria Elena Garcia-Upson), available at
http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2008-01-22-1094435090_x.htm. It was for this reason that
Escondido, California stipulated to a permanent injunction of its All housing provision. See
Statement Regarding City of Escondido Actions Approving Stipulation for Final Judgment and
Permanent Injunction 1 (Dec. 13, 2006) (noting that "the lack of an assured federal database to
determine the status of individuals for housing purposes" was a "serious problem"), available at
http://www.ci.escondido.ca.us/immigration/Statement.pdf.
246. Congress authorized the development of the Basic Pilot program in 1996, through the
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act ("IIRIRA"), §§ 401-405, Pub. L.
104-208, codified as a note to 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (2000). Currently, participation in the Basic
Pilot/E-Verify system is voluntary, and only a fraction of employers do so. See NAT'L IMMIGR.
LAw
CTR.,
BASIC
PILOT/E-VERIFY
NOT
A
MAGIC
BULLET
1
(2008),
http://www.nilc.org/immsemplymnt/ircaempverif/e-verify-nomagicbullet_2008-01-04.pdf
[hereinafter NOT A MAGIC BULLET] (noting that fewer than one percent of U.S. employers take
part in the voluntary system).
247. NOT A MAGIC BULLET, supra note 246, at 1.
248. Id.
249. Information about SAVE and E-Verify is available at the U.S. Customs and
Immigration Service's website, www.uscis.gov. The National Crime Information Center also
maintains an "Immigration Violators File," which is the primary nationwide law enforcement
database queried regularly by local law enforcement officials. Jeff Sessions & Cynthia Hayden,
The Growing Role for State & Local Law Enforcement in the Realm of Immigration Law, 16
STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 323, 325 (2005). However, this database is limited to people who have
received final orders of deportation and have absconded, which is only a small fraction of the
total illegal immigrant population, id. at 325 n.4 (noting that of the roughly 10 million illegal
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First, these databases are filled with inaccuracies, and these
inaccuracies disproportionately work to the detriment of noncitizens
and naturalized citizens. Audits of the E-Verify program have found
that foreign-born people who are work authorized are thirty times
more likely to receive a tentative nonconfirmation from the
database. 250 Almost 10% of foreign-born individuals who are U.S.
citizens receive erroneous tentative nonconfirmations. 2 51 Because of
data entry errors, lack of updated information, and inconsistent
recordkeeping systems across databases, an estimated 20% of all
initial program entries result in false negatives. 25 2 The Social Security
Administration's database is riddled with errors, which are caused by
data-entry mistakes, inconsistent transliteration of foreign names,
applicants who use a less "foreign" sounding first name for work
purposes, and different naming conventions that are common in many
parts of the world (such as multiple surnames, or the inversion of
family name and given name). 253 The problems with these databases
led Illinois to pass a law prohibiting employers from making use of the

immigrants in the United States in 2004, there were approximately 400,000 absconders), and
even this database is incomplete, id. at 325 n.5 (noting that of the 400,000 absconders believed to
be in the United States as of 2004, only 38,587 had been entered into the IVF database).
250. WESTAT, FINDINGS OF THE WEB BASIC PILOT EVALUATION

(2007) [hereinafter 2007

Audit], available at http://www.uscis.gov/files/article/WebBasicPilotRprtSept2OO7.pdf; U.S. GOV'T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, PUBL'N No. GAO-05-813, IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT: WEAKNESSES
HINDER EMPLOYMENT VERIFICATION AND WORKSITE ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS (2005) [hereinafter

2005 GAO REPORT], available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/dO5813.pdf.
251. 2007 Audit, supra note 250, at 97.
252. Problems in Current Employment Verification and Worksite Enforcement System:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugee, Border Security, and
InternationalLaw of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, I10th Cong. 6 (2007) (statement of Stephen
available at http://judiciary.house.
Testimony],
Yale-Loehr
[hereinafter
Yale-Loehr)
govfhearings/April2007[Yale-LoehrO7O424.pdf.
253. Complaint 25, Am. Fed'n of Labor v. Chertoff, No. C 07-04472 CRB, 2007 WL 2972952
(N.D. Cal. 2007) (filed Aug. 28, 2007). It is estimated that the SSA database contains more than
17 million discrepancies. SOCIAL SEC. ADMIN., OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., CONGRESSIONAL
RESPONSE REP. No. A-08-06-26100, ACCURACY OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION'S

NUMIDENT FILE 5 (2006), available at http://www.ssa.gov/oig/ADOBEPDF/A-08-06-26100.pdf. An
estimated 4.8 million records for noncitizens who are work authorized, and 248,560 for
naturalized U.S. citizens contain discrepancies that may result in inaccurate employment
eligibility results when the database is queried. Id. at 9, 11.
When an employer's records do not match the SSA's records, the SSA sends the employer a
"no-match" letter notifying them of the discrepancy. 20 C.F.R. § 422.120(a) (2008). In 2007, the
DHS passed a rule that would require employers receiving such letters to take immediate action
against the referenced employees. See Am. Fed'n of Labor v. Chertoff, 552 F. Supp. 2d 999, 100304 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (explaining that employers may not simply disregard these notices). In
October of 2007 a federal district court judge enjoined enforcement of the rule because of
concerns over the accuracy of the database. Id. at 1015.
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E-Verify system. 254 As a result of these flaws, noncitizens and
naturalized citizens suffer expense and delays in obtaining
employment. If the false negative cannot be reconciled, the records
must be verified by hand, which can take two weeks or longer. 25 5 This
causes problems for employees who wish to begin work. For a family
waiting to move into an apartment, such a delay may cause a serious
hardship.
Second, studies have also shown that employers consistently
use the E-Verify system improperly, in ways that harm noncitizens
and national origin minorities. A Memorandum of Understanding that
all users must sign requires that E-Verify only be used to verify the
status of individuals who have received offers of employment-that is,
it should not to be used to screen job applicants or to eliminate
existing employees hired before E-Verify's creation. 256 In addition,
employers are prohibited from penalizing employees who receive a
tentative nonconfirmation. Audits of the program, however, have
discovered that employers are likely to use E-Verify to do all the
above: screen out applicants, weed out existing employees, and
257
penalize employees whose status cannot be immediately confirmed.
These actions are disproportionately taken against Asian and Latino
workers.
The lack of a centralized system makes any system requiring
"dial-in" or web-based verification infeasible. Simply maintaining an
easily accessible, constantly changing database with information
about every single legally present noncitizen-a larger group than
those people who are work authorized-would be a costly and
daunting administrative task. Even with such a system, verification of
all prospective tenants of rental housing would be impractical and
extremely expensive given the numbers involved. Rental housing
makes up a significant amount of the private housing market. In 2000,
254. Illinois Act, Pub. L. No. 095-0138 § 12(a) (amending the Illinois Right to Privacy in the
Workplace Act, 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 55/1, et seq.). The federal government challenged the law.
Complaint, United States v. Illinois (C.D. Ill. filed Sept. 24, 2007), available at
In response,
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/US_v_IllinoisComplaint_092407_toFile.pdf.
Illinois agreed to halt the enforcement of the law, and both parties requested that the lawsuit be
stayed in order to give the Illinois General Assembly the chance to override the law. See Stephen
Franklin, Deal On Verifying Workers Reached: Illinois Won't Block Checks of Legal Status, CHI.
TRIB., Dec. 18, 2007, at A3.
255. Yale-Loehr Testimony, supra note 252, at 6 (noting that the verification process can
take two weeks or longer for noncitizens); 2005 GAO REPORT, supra note 250, at 23-24 (noting
that fifteen percent of queries required manual verification, and that of these, some took as long
as two weeks to resolve).
8
256. Basic Employment Verification Pilot Memorandum of Understanding art. II, § C,
(2006), availableat http://www.uscis.gov/files/articleMOU.pdf.
257. 2007 Audit, supra note 250, at 100-01.
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there were more than 35.6 million units of rental housing in the
United States, which accounted for 33.8% of all housing. 258 The
average rental unit contained 2.4 people. 25 9 Recall from the earlier
discussion of the Fair Housing Act that, to comply with the law, All
provisions must apply to all prospective tenants, not simply those who
"seem foreign." 260 Thus, every single renter or prospective renter
would have to prove his or her legal status prior to signing a lease. If
AII housing restrictions became national policy, this would come out
to well over 85 million people whose status would have to be
verified. 26 1 Creating and operating a program of this magnitude would
262
be both costly and a bureaucratic nightmare.
The U.S. immigration system is extremely complex. It already
requires an enormous bureaucracy to administer and enforce. It
necessitates unwieldy databases and multiple processes just to verify
whether a person is work eligible. If landlords and local officials were
required to determine whether every tenant is "lease eligible," the
bureaucratic obstacles and costs would be prohibitive. It is unlikely
that the nation's landlords-and tenants-would be willing to accept
this extra layer of regulation and bureaucracy. The collateral
consequence of such a regime would likely be that many small
landlords would choose to leave the rental business entirely, rather
than assume the costs and legal risks of attempting to comply.

258. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, GENERAL HOUSING CHARACTERISTICS (2000), available at
http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/QTSubjectShowTablesServlet?-lang=en&-ts=249054700826
(select "QT-H1. General Housing Characteristics").
259. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HOUSEHOLD POPULATION AND HOUSEHOLD TYPE BY TENURE
(2000), available at http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/QTTable?hbm=y&-geo-id=Ol000US&qrname=DEC_2000_SFI_U_QTH3&-ds-name=DEC_2000_SFIU.
260. See supra Section II.B.2.a.
261. This figure represents a snap shot of the rental population at any given time, and
cannot be used to make an estimate of the number of verifications that would be required
annually. Obviously, some people remain in rental housing for more than one year, in which case
their status presumably would not have to be re-verified. However, others may enter into shortterm leases and may move during the year, in which case their status would have to be verified
more than once in a single year. This also does not take into consideration the verifications that
would need to occur in response to complaints, if such a mechanism were contained in a federal
policy.
262. By way of comparison, it is estimated that making a dial-in version of the Basic Pilot
system mandatory for all 8.4 million employers in the United States would cost the federal
government, employers, and employees about $11.7 billion total per year, with employers
bearing most of the costs. 2005 GAO REPORT, supra note 250, at 29. An expert who testified
about the ramifications of making the E-Verify Program mandatory for all employers, stated that
"expanding Basic Pilot in its current state and requiring participation by all 8.4 million
employers would be a bureaucratic nightmare." Yale-Loehr Testimony, supra note 252, at 6.
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IV. THE NEED TO PROTECT HOUSING ACCESS FOR LEGALLY
PRESENT NONCITIZENS, LEGAL IMMIGRANTS, AND NATIONAL
ORIGIN MINORITIES GENERALLY

The analysis in Section II concluded that AII housing
ordinances are likely to cause landlords to violate the Fair Housing
Act and lead to increased housing discrimination against national
origin minorities. Even though AII ordinances do not facially conflict
with the FHA (they do not, after all, instruct landlords to discriminate
on the basis of national origin), they will almost inevitably violate it in
their application. A regime in which both coexist, therefore, is
untenable. As a result, Congress has two choices: it must either
remove the prohibition against national origin discrimination from the
FHA, or it must prevent municipalities from enacting AII housing
provisions.
If Congress removes national origin as a protected
characteristic from the FHA, the result will be disastrous for national
origin minorities. National origin was listed as a protected
characteristic in the original version of the FHA precisely because
Congress recognized that, like race, it is highly likely to be the object
of invidious discrimination. 263 Private discrimination based on
national origin has been commonplace in American history. 264 Local
governments have used their zoning and regulatory power to target
national origin minorities since at least the mid-1800s. 265 Racially
263. National origin, race, and religion have long been the characteristics most clearly
protected by modern civil rights laws. TRACEY MCCARTNEY & SARA PRATT, THE FAIR HOUSING
ACT:
35
YEARS
OF
EVOLUTION
1
(2008),
http://www.fairhousing.com/include/
media/pdf/35years.pdf. They were the original protected characteristics in Title VII and in the
FHA (which was modeled to some degree on Title VII). Id. There was little separate discussion of
national origin in the legislative history of either statute, most likely because race and national
origin were seen as having significant overlap. Raechel L. Adams, Comment, English-Only in the
Workplace: A New JudicialLens Will Provide More Comprehensive Title VII Protection, 47 CATH.
U. L. REV. 1327, 1330-32 (1998). Sex was not added to the FHA until 1972, and disability and
familial status were not added until 1988. MCCARTNEY & PRATT, supra,at 3-4.
264. Joe R. Feagin, White Supremacy and Mexican Americans: Rethinking the "Black-White
Paradigm," 54 RUTGERS L. REV. 959, 975-76 (2002); Rachel F. Moran, What if Latinos Really
Mattered in the PublicPolicy Debate?, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1315, 1322-23 (1997).
265. In response to an influx of Chinese immigrants during the mid-part of the 1800s,
municipalities in California enacted zoning laws that directly discriminated against them. Joel
Kosman, Toward an Inclusionary Jurisprudence:A Reconceptualization of Zoning, 43 CATH. U.
LAW. REV. 59, 63 (1993). When these laws were struck down, the municipalities passed faciallyneutral ordinances that were nevertheless targeted at the Chinese, and which were struck down
by the Supreme Court. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373 (1886) (describing San
Francisco ordinance regulating laundries that was applied only to Chinese immigrants).
Nonetheless, municipalities continued to pass "Chinese laundry" ordinances into the 1930s.
David E. Bernstein, Lochner, Parity, and the Chinese Laundry Cases, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV.
211, 230 (1999).
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restrictive zoning was common in the beginning of the twentieth
century. 266 One of the fears of early opponents of modern zoning was
that municipalities would use zoning ordinances "for the purpose of
segregating in like manner various groups of newly arrived
267
immigrants."
Even with national origin as a protected characteristic, all of
the available data indicate that national origin minoritiesparticularly Latinos--continue to face tremendous levels of
discrimination in the private rental market. The most comprehensive
national testing project done to date found that there is a 25.7%
likelihood that a Latino will be discriminated against when seeking
rental housing. 268 Based on these findings, it is estimated that a total
of 1,178,315 instances of discrimination against Latinos occur
annually in the private rental market. 269 Testing for "accent
discrimination" reveals that Latinos with a discernable accent may be
discriminated against as much as two-thirds of the time they attempt
to obtain rental housing. 270 Latinos currently experience high levels of
residential segregation from non-Latino whites. 27 1 And even though
overt national origin discrimination in zoning is prohibited,
municipalities have found more indirect ways in recent years to target
272
Latinos for discrimination.
266. For a discussion of racially-restrictive zoning ordinances, see Oliveri, supra note 112, at
59-62. The Supreme Court struck down racially-restrictive zoning laws in 1917. Buchanan v.
Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917). Despite this, municipalities continued to pass such laws, which
continued to be struck down, for another thirteen years. See City of Richmond v. Deans, 281 U.S.
704, 704 (1930) (affirming the Fourth Circuit's holding that struck down a racially-restrictive
zoning ordinance in Virginia); Harmon v. Tyler, 273 U.S. 668, 668 (1927) (reversing the
Louisiana Supreme Court's ruling in favor of a zoning ordinance that racially discriminated
against African-Americans).
267. Ambler Realty Co. v. Vill. of Euclid, 297 F. 307, 313 (N.D. Ohio 1924), rev'd, 272 U.S.
365 (1926).
268. U.S. DEPT. OF HOUSING & URBAN DEv., HOUSING DISCRIMINATION SURVEY FINAL
REPORT 3-5 (2002). This was the researchers' best estimate. Id. Their upper-bound estimate was
that Latinos would be discriminated against 52.7% of the time. Id.
269. NAT'L FAIR HOUSING ALLIANCE, 2004 FAIR HOUSING TRENDS REPORT 3 (2004).
270. Robert G. Schwemm, Why Do Landlords Still Discriminate (And What Can Be Done
About It)?, 40 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 455, 477 n. 119 (2007) (describing testing in various cities that
showed rates of discrimination at 66%, 65%, and 52%).
271. Researchers use an Index of Dissimilarity ("ID") to compute how segregated a particular
racial or ethnic group is from other groups. LEWIS MUMFORD CTR., ETHNIC DIVERSITY GROWS,
NEIGHBORHOOD INTEGRATION LAGS BEHIND (2001), available at http://mumford.albany
.edu/census/WholePop/WPreport/pagel.html. Values of forty to fifty are considered moderate. Id.
In 2000, Latinos had an ID value of 51.5 from non-Latino whites. Id. Troublingly, while the ID
value for African-Americans and whites has been steadily declining in the last twenty years, the
ID values for Latinos have remained essentially unchanged. Id.
272. See, e.g., Feagin, supra note 264, at 979-80 (describing how, in cities from New York to
California, discriminatory building code enforcement has been used to target Latinos); Yale
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National origin minorities, particularly recent immigrants,
share characteristics that make them more vulnerable to housing
discrimination and poor treatment by unscrupulous landlords. For
example, landlords may take advantage of their tenants' lack of legal
status, knowing that they will not complain. 2 73 Even immigrants who
are legally present may be reluctant to initiate complaints because
they are not citizens. 274 They may also be unaware that they possess
legal rights not to be discriminated against in housing and lack
knowledge of where to go for help. 275 Language differences may also
act as an impediment. 276 In addition to outright national origin
discrimination, the financial circumstances and family characteristics
(such as larger and extended families) of recent immigrants make it
difficult for them to find housing and easier for landlords to
277
discriminate against them.
National origin is thus an extremely important protected
characteristic in the housing context, and eliminating it would
threaten access to housing for millions of national origin minorities.
The AII housing ordinances, therefore, must go. The United States
needs a strong national policy against AII housing restrictions; thus,
Congress should enact legislation explicitly preempting states and
278
localities from enacting such restrictions.
Rabin, Expulsive Zoning: The Inequitable Legacy of Euclid, in ZONING AND THE AMERICAN
DREAM: PROMISES STILL TO KEEP 101-20 (Charles M. Haar & Jerold S. Kayden eds., 1989)
(documenting cases in which cities displaced thousands of black and Latino residents using
"urban renewal" after the minority neighborhoods had been deliberately blighted through
overzoning and lack of municipal services); Carla Dorsey, Note, It Takes a Village: Why
Community Organizing is More Effective than Litigation Alone at Ending Discriminatory
Housing Code Enforcement, 12 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POE'Y 437, 441-58 (2005) (describing
attempts by several cities to condemn, destroy, and redevelop predominantly Latino areas);
Luna, supra note 151, at 72-77 (describing pattern of Midwestern municipalities enacting
restrictive occupancy codes in order to keep out Latinos and enforcing housing codes against
Latinos in a discriminatory and abusive manner); Feagin, supra note 264, at 979-80 (describing
how, in cities from New York to California, discriminatory building code enforcement has been
used to target Latinos); Paul F. Cuadros, Suburban Housing Inspectors Crack Down on Latinos,
CHI. REP. (Sept. 1995), available at http://www.chicagoreporter.com/issue/index.php?issueld=289
(describing how communities in the Chicago suburbs used occupancy restrictions and housing
codes to target Latino immigrants).
273. Luna, supra note 151, at 67-68.
274. Herminia L. Cubillos, Fair Housing and Latinos, 2 LA RAZA L.J. 49, 59 (1988).
275. Id.
276. Id.

277. Id. at 50-51.
278. In an ideal world, Congress would still remain sensitive to the reality that local
governments do the lion's share of the work of accommodating and assimilating immigrant
populations. Congress could perhaps make funding available to such communities so that they
can undertake housing rehabilitation programs, comprehensive planning, and other measures
designed to successfully absorb a population of newcomers. The City of Santa Ana, California
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The time may well come, however, when Congress is asked to
consider what actions it can take to restrict housing for unauthorized
immigrants. It may wish to devolve authority to the states to act or
enter into cooperative agreements with localities or require individual
landlords to screen for legal status. For the reasons discussed in
Section III, however, none of these options is advisable. Congress must
not only prevent states and municipalities from legislating in this
area; it must also decline to take any action itself in support of All
measures.
This, however, will still not go far enough to protect national
origin minorities and legally present noncitizens from housing
discrimination because housing discrimination based on legal status
279
and alienage remains permissible under the Fair Housing Act.
Landlords may attempt on their own initiative to screen tenants for
legal status or alienage, or landlords may feel pressure to do so from
municipal authorities or community members. There are two problems
with this. First, these attempts will only lead to discrimination
slippage and result in discrimination based on national origin. Second,
even in the absence of discrimination slippage, housing discrimination
against noncitizens who are legally present in the United States is
problematic. It is illogical and bizarre that our national immigration
law permits legally present noncitizens to reside here, and yet our
housing rights law allows private individuals to deny them housing
because of their legal status.
In addition to preempting subfederal governments from
passing AII housing ordinances, Congress should make alienage a
protected characteristic in the Fair Housing Act, clearly according
legally present noncitizens the same level of protection in the housing
market that they receive in the employment market. 28 0 The FHA's
omission of alienage invites discrimination and has empowered the
municipalities that passed AII housing ordinances. 2 1 There is no good

provides an exemplary case study of how municipalities can use their land-use and
redevelopment powers to respond to influxes of immigrant groups without discriminating against
or marginalizing them. See, e.g., Stacy Harwood & Dowell Myers, The Dynamic of Immigration
and Local Governance in Santa Ana: Neighborhood Activism, Overcrowding, and Land-Use
Policy, 30 POL'Y STUDIES J. 70, 70-91 (2002) (analyzing the City of Santa Ana's use of land-use
policy to promote urban revitalization and bring substandard housing up to code).
279. As discussed supra, note 127, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 provides some protection against
alienage discrimination, but is an imperfect remedy.
280. In the absence of clear guidance from the Supreme Court, Congress should also specify
that private acts of housing discrimination based on alienage are prohibited by § 1981.
281. At least one municipality to pass a housing AI ordinance, Farmers Branch, specifically
noted the fact that the FHA has no protection for alienage in the preamble to its ordinance. See
Farmers Branch, Tex., Ordinance 2892 (Nov. 13, 2006), available at http://www.aclu.org/
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reason to permit a landlord to discriminate on this basis, particularly
with respect to permanent residents who have indicated an intention
to reside in this country indefinitely. 282 At the same time, there is a
strong likelihood that such discrimination is based on animus toward
noncitizens, national origin minorities, or both. At least one major
city, New York City, has recognized this, and has a longstanding
about
or
inquiring
from
landlords
prohibiting
ordinance
of
status
or
citizenship
alienage
discriminating on the basis of the
28 3
tenants.
existing
prospective or
But adding alienage as a protected status still may not go far
enough. In the absence of a prohibition against legal status
discrimination, landlords are free to discriminate against groups of
people who are legally entitled to be in the United States. For
example, a landlord can decide to rent to people with a particular legal
status, such as lawful permanent residents, but not to others, such as
individuals on work or student visas. Moreover, discrimination
slippage suggests that a prohibition against alienage-based
discrimination would be meaningless without protection based on
legal status. It would be far too easy for a landlord attempting to
discriminate only on the basis of legal status to discriminate based on
citizenship or national origin. Therefore, Congress should also
consider making legal status a protected category in the Fair Housing
Act. This would prohibit housing providers from inquiring about or
discriminating based on a person's immigration status. This would
also interpose another barrier to local and state governments trying to
pass AII housing ordinances.
Recently, California adopted a first-of-its-kind law that does
exactly this. The law prohibits landlords from asking tenants or
prospective tenants for proof of legal status 284 and prohibits California
municipalities from passing legislation to compel landlords to make
such inquiries. 285 Not surprisingly, the law passed with the support of

pdfs/immigrants/farmersbranchordinance.pdf ("WHEREAS, the Fair Housing Act does not
prohibit distinctions based solely on a person's citizenship status .... ").
282. For temporary (non-immigrant) visitors who are present on student or work visas, an
argument could be made that landlords should be able to limit lease terms to the length of time
that a tenant is legally permitted to remain in the country, because temporary visitors are
subject to deportation after their time expires. However, visas may be extended or new visas may
be issued, and until these things happen there is no way to determine how long a visa holder will
be permitted to remain in the United States.
283. N.Y. CITY ADMIN. CODE § 8-107(5).
284. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1940.3(b) (West 2007).
285. Id. § 1940.3(a).
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both immigrant rights groups and apartment owners. 28 6 At the time of
this writing, the law had only recently gone into effect, so its longterm effects are difficult to gauge. 28 7 From the perspective of
safeguarding housing for national origin minorities and legally
present noncitizens, however, it is clearly a step in the right direction.
CONCLUSION

The combination of AII ordinances, discrimination slippage,
congressional inaction on comprehensive immigration reform, and the
gaps in fair housing laws has left us in an unstable position with
respect to housing our nation's immigrants and national origin
minorities. Something has to give. Unfortunately, the Hazleton
opinion merely defers the reckoning to another time or another
authority.
In order to protect national origin minorities who are citizens
and legally present noncitizens from discrimination, it is not enough
for the federal government to bar localities from passing AII housing
ordinances and to refuse to act itself. Such discrimination already
occurs to a significant degree, and it is only encouraged by the
contentious nature of the immigration debate. Discrimination
slippage, and the fact that both alienage and legal status
discrimination are permissible under the Fair Housing Act, already
create conditions in which people who have every right to be in this
country are likely to be discriminated against in housing.
As a result, Congress must create affirmative protections in the
Fair Housing Act for both alienage and legal status. However, the
experience of California notwithstanding, a blanket prohibition
against taking legal status into consideration in housing would be a
hard sell as a matter of federal law. Even the most pro-immigrant
politicians tend to draw the line at illegal immigrants, and there
would be enormous political backlash among some constituencies if
such a law did pass. Given the intense emotions surrounding the issue
of illegal immigration, it is difficult to imagine the general population
accepting the concept of illegal immigrants being given any type of

286. See Frank D. Russo, CaliforniaBecomes First State to ProhibitLandlords From Asking
About Tenants' Immigration Status, CAL. PROGREss REP., Oct. 12, 2007, available at
http://www.californiaprogressreport.com/2007/10/californiabeco.html (discussing the passage of
California's law and its widespread support).
287. Future scholarship should examine whether the new law has an effect on the overall
level of housing discrimination against Latinos and other national origin minorities in
California, and whether it appreciably affects housing quality and overcrowding.
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"special protection" in the law, particularly if this law is imposed from
28 8
Washington.
It is important, however, to underscore that these (somewhat
radical) reforms I propose are necessary to combat discrimination
against American citizens who are national origin minorities and
legally present noncitizens-groups of people whom our laws recognize
as having every right to be here. That my proposals will also have the
effect of making life slightly easier for undocumented immigrants is a
collateral consequence that, I submit, is worth accepting when it
comes to an area as fundamental as access to housing.

288. Admittedly, Peter Spiro's "steam valve" theory of immigration federalism cautions
against such top-down measures. Peter J. Spiro, Learning to Live With Immigration Federalism,
29 CONN. L. REV. 1627, 1628-39 (1997).

